Publications
All accompanying preregistration, data, and supplemental materials under “Links”
Bruneau, E G; Dufour, N; Saxe, R
In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol. 367, pp. 717 - 730, 2012, ISSN: 0962-8436.
@article{144,
title = {Social cognition in members of conflict groups: behavioural and neural responses in Arabs, Israelis and South Americans to each other’s misfortunes},
author = {E G Bruneau and N Dufour and R Saxe},
url = {http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/cgi/doi/10.1098/rstb.2011.0293
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/717.full_.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1098/rstb.2011.0293},
issn = {0962-8436},
year = {2012},
date = {2012-02-01},
urldate = {2012-02-01},
journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
volume = {367},
pages = {717 - 730},
abstract = {<p>In contexts of cultural conflict, people delegitimize the other group’s perspective and lose compassion for the other group’s suffering. These psychological biases have been empirically characterized in intergroup settings, but rarely in groups involved in active conflict. Similarly, the basic brain networks involved in recognizing others’ narratives and misfortunes have been identified, but how these brain networks are modulated by intergroup conflict is largely untested. In the present study, we examined behavioural and neural responses in Arab, Israeli and South American participants while they considered the pain and suffering of individuals from each group. Arabs and Israelis reported feeling significantly less compassion for each other’s pain and suffering (the ‘conflict outgroup’), but did not show an ingroup bias relative to South Americans (the ‘distant outgroup’). In contrast, the brain regions that respond to others’ tragedies showed an ingroup bias relative to the distant outgroup but not the conflict outgroup, particularly for descriptions of emotional suffering. Over all, neural responses to conflict group members were qualitatively different from neural responses to distant group members. This is the first neuroimaging study to examine brain responses to others’ suffering across both distant and conflict groups, and provides a first step towards building a foundation for the biological basis of conflict.</p>},
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pubstate = {published},
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}
<p>In contexts of cultural conflict, people delegitimize the other group’s perspective and lose compassion for the other group’s suffering. These psychological biases have been empirically characterized in intergroup settings, but rarely in groups involved in active conflict. Similarly, the basic brain networks involved in recognizing others’ narratives and misfortunes have been identified, but how these brain networks are modulated by intergroup conflict is largely untested. In the present study, we examined behavioural and neural responses in Arab, Israeli and South American participants while they considered the pain and suffering of individuals from each group. Arabs and Israelis reported feeling significantly less compassion for each other’s pain and suffering (the ‘conflict outgroup’), but did not show an ingroup bias relative to South Americans (the ‘distant outgroup’). In contrast, the brain regions that respond to others’ tragedies showed an ingroup bias relative to the distant outgroup but not the conflict outgroup, particularly for descriptions of emotional suffering. Over all, neural responses to conflict group members were qualitatively different from neural responses to distant group members. This is the first neuroimaging study to examine brain responses to others’ suffering across both distant and conflict groups, and provides a first step towards building a foundation for the biological basis of conflict.</p>
Bedny, M; Caramazza, A; Pascual-Leone, A; Saxe, R
Typical Neural Representations of Action Verbs Develop without Vision Journal Article
In: Cerebral Cortex, vol. 22, pp. 286 - 293, 2012, ISSN: 1047-3211.
@article{135,
title = {Typical Neural Representations of Action Verbs Develop without Vision},
author = {M Bedny and A Caramazza and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhr081
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bhr081.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1093/cercor/bhr081},
issn = {1047-3211},
year = {2012},
date = {2012-02-01},
urldate = {2012-02-01},
journal = {Cerebral Cortex},
volume = {22},
pages = {286 - 293},
abstract = {<p>Many empiricist theories hold that concepts are composed of sensory-motor primitives. For example, the meaning of the word ‘‘run’’ is in part a visual image of running. If action concepts are partly visual, then the concepts of congenitally blind individuals should be altered in that they lack these visual features. We compared semantic judgments and neural activity during action verb comprehension in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Participants made similarity judgments about pairs of nouns and verbs that varied in the visual motion they conveyed. Blind adults showed the same pattern of similarity judgments as sighted adults. We identified the left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG) brain region that putatively stores visual-motion features relevant to action verbs. The functional profile and location of this region was identical in sighted and congenitally blind individuals. Furthermore, the lMTG was more active for all verbs than nouns, irrespective of visual–motion features. We conclude that the lMTG contains abstract representations of verb meanings rather than visual-motion images. Our data suggest that conceptual brain regions are not altered by the sensory modality of learning.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Many empiricist theories hold that concepts are composed of sensory–motor primitives. For example, the meaning of the word ‘‘run’’ is in part a visual image of running. If action concepts are partly visual, then the concepts of congenitally blind individuals should be altered in that they lack these visual features. We compared semantic judgments and neural activity during action verb comprehension in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Participants made similarity judgments about pairs of nouns and verbs that varied in the visual motion they conveyed. Blind adults showed the same pattern of similarity judgments as sighted adults. We identified the left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG) brain region that putatively stores visual–motion features relevant to action verbs. The functional profile and location of this region was identical in sighted and congenitally blind individuals. Furthermore, the lMTG was more active for all verbs than nouns, irrespective of visual–motion features. We conclude that the lMTG contains abstract representations of verb meanings rather than visual–motion images. Our data suggest that conceptual brain regions are not altered by the sensory modality of learning.</p>
Frank, Michael C; Fedorenko, Evelina; Lai, Peter; Saxe, Rebecca; Gibson, Edward
Verbal interference suppresses exact numerical representation Journal Article
In: Cognitive Psychology, vol. 64, pp. 74 - 92, 2012, ISSN: 00100285.
@article{136,
title = {Verbal interference suppresses exact numerical representation},
author = {Michael C Frank and Evelina Fedorenko and Peter Lai and Rebecca Saxe and Edward Gibson},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010028511000880
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FFLSG-cogpsych-inpress.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.10.004},
issn = {00100285},
year = {2012},
date = {2012-02-01},
urldate = {2012-02-01},
journal = {Cognitive Psychology},
volume = {64},
pages = {74 - 92},
abstract = {<p>Language for number is an important case study of the relationship between language and cognition because the mechanisms of nonverbal numerical cognition are well-understood. When the Pirahã (an Amazonian hunter-gatherer tribe who have no exact number words) are tested in non-verbal numerical tasks, they are able to perform one-to-one matching tasks but make errors in more difficult tasks. Their pattern of errors suggests that they are using analog magnitude estimation, an evolutionarily- and developmentally-conserved mechanism for estimating quantities. Here we show that English-speaking participants rely on the same mechanisms when verbal number representations are unavailable due to verbal interference. Followup experiments demonstrate that the effects of verbal interference are primarily manifest during encoding of quantity information, and—using a new procedure for matching difficulty of interference tasks for individual participants—that the effects are restricted to verbal interference. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that number words are used online to encode, store, and manipulate numerical information. This linguistic strategy complements, rather than altering or replacing, non-verbal representations.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Language for number is an important case study of the relationship between language and cognition because the mechanisms of nonverbal numerical cognition are well-understood. When the Pirahã (an Amazonian hunter-gatherer tribe who have no exact number words) are tested in non-verbal numerical tasks, they are able to perform one-to-one matching tasks but make errors in more difficult tasks. Their pattern of errors suggests that they are using analog magnitude estimation, an evolutionarily- and developmentally-conserved mechanism for estimating quantities. Here we show that English-speaking participants rely on the same mechanisms when verbal number representations are unavailable due to verbal interference. Followup experiments demonstrate that the effects of verbal interference are primarily manifest during encoding of quantity information, and—using a new procedure for matching difficulty of interference tasks for individual participants—that the effects are restricted to verbal interference. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that number words are used online to encode, store, and manipulate numerical information. This linguistic strategy complements, rather than altering or replacing, non-verbal representations.</p>
Bruneau, Emile G; Pluta, Agnieszka; Saxe, Rebecca
Distinct roles of the ‘Shared Pain’ and ‘Theory of Mind’ networks in processing others’ emotional suffering Journal Article
In: Neuropsychologia, vol. 50, pp. 219 - 231, 2012, ISSN: 00283932.
@article{142,
title = {Distinct roles of the ‘Shared Pain’ and ‘Theory of Mind’ networks in processing others’ emotional suffering},
author = {Emile G Bruneau and Agnieszka Pluta and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393211005082
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bruneau_saxe_1.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.11.008},
issn = {00283932},
year = {2012},
date = {2012-01-01},
urldate = {2012-01-01},
journal = {Neuropsychologia},
volume = {50},
pages = {219 - 231},
abstract = {<p>The brain mechanisms involved in processing another’s physical pain have been extensively studied in recent years. The link between understanding others’ physical pain and emotional suffering is less well understood. Using whole brain analysis and two separate functional localizers, we characterized the neural response profiles of narrative scenarios involving physical pain (PP), and scenarios involving emotional pain (EP) with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Whole brain analyses revealed that PP narratives activated the Shared Pain network, and that the brain regions responsible for processing EP overlapped substantially with brain regions involved in Theory of Mind. Region of interest (ROI) analysis provided a finer-grained view. Some regions responded to stories involving physical states, regardless of painful content (secondary sensory regions), some selectively responded to both emotionally and physically painful events (bilateral anterior thalamus and anterior middle cingulate cortex), one brain region responded selectively to physical pain (left insula), and one brain region responded selectively to emotional pain (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex). These results replicated in two groups of participants given different explicit tasks. Together, these results clarify the distinct roles of multiple brain regions in responding to others who are in physical or emotional pain.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>The brain mechanisms involved in processing another’s physical pain have been extensively studied in recent years. The link between understanding others’ physical pain and emotional suffering is less well understood. Using whole brain analysis and two separate functional localizers, we characterized the neural response profiles of narrative scenarios involving physical pain (PP), and scenarios involving emotional pain (EP) with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Whole brain analyses revealed that PP narratives activated the Shared Pain network, and that the brain regions responsible for processing EP overlapped substantially with brain regions involved in Theory of Mind. Region of interest (ROI) analysis provided a finer-grained view. Some regions responded to stories involving physical states, regardless of painful content (secondary sensory regions), some selectively responded to both emotionally and physically painful events (bilateral anterior thalamus and anterior middle cingulate cortex), one brain region responded selectively to physical pain (left insula), and one brain region responded selectively to emotional pain (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex). These results replicated in two groups of participants given different explicit tasks. Together, these results clarify the distinct roles of multiple brain regions in responding to others who are in physical or emotional pain.</p>
Bedny, Marina; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Dravida, Swethasri; Saxe, Rebecca
A sensitive period for language in the visual cortex: Distinct patterns of plasticity in congenitally versus late blind adults Journal Article
In: Brain and Language, vol. 122, pp. 162 - 170, 2011, ISSN: 0093934X.
@article{145,
title = {A sensitive period for language in the visual cortex: Distinct patterns of plasticity in congenitally versus late blind adults},
author = {Marina Bedny and Alvaro Pascual-Leone and Swethasri Dravida and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0093934X11001799
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms-337975.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.bandl.2011.10.005},
issn = {0093934X},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-09-01},
urldate = {2011-09-01},
journal = {Brain and Language},
volume = {122},
pages = {162 - 170},
abstract = {<p>Recent evidence suggests that blindness enables visual circuits to contribute to language processing. We examined whether this dramatic functional plasticity has a sensitive period. BOLD fMRI signal was measured in congenitally blind, late blind (blindness onset 9-years-old or later) and sighted participants while they performed a sentence comprehension task. In a control condition, participants listened to backwards speech and made match/non-match to sample judgments. In both, congenitally and late blind participants BOLD signal increased in bilateral foveal-pericalcarine cortex during response preparation, irrespective of whether the stimulus was a sentence or backwards speech. However, only in congenitally blind people left occipital areas (pericalcarine, extrastriate, fusiform and lateral) responded more to sentences than backwards speech. We conclude that age of blindness onset constrains the non-visual functions of occipital cortex: while plasticity is present in both congenitally and late blind individuals, recruitment of visual circuits for language depends on blindness during childhood.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Recent evidence suggests that blindness enables visual circuits to contribute to language processing. We examined whether this dramatic functional plasticity has a sensitive period. BOLD fMRI signal was measured in congenitally blind, late blind (blindness onset 9-years-old or later) and sighted participants while they performed a sentence comprehension task. In a control condition, participants listened to backwards speech and made match/non-match to sample judgments. In both, congenitally and late blind participants BOLD signal increased in bilateral foveal-pericalcarine cortex during response preparation, irrespective of whether the stimulus was a sentence or backwards speech. However, only in congenitally blind people left occipital areas (pericalcarine, extrastriate, fusiform and lateral) responded more to sentences than backwards speech. We conclude that age of blindness onset constrains the non-visual functions of occipital cortex: while plasticity is present in both congenitally and late blind individuals, recruitment of visual circuits for language depends on blindness during childhood.</p>
Young, Liane; Saxe, Rebecca
When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains Journal Article
In: Cognition, vol. 120, pp. 202 - 214, 2011, ISSN: 00100277.
@article{150,
title = {When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains},
author = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027711001107
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/YoungSaxe_2011_Cognition.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.005},
issn = {00100277},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-08-01},
urldate = {2011-08-01},
journal = {Cognition},
volume = {120},
pages = {202 - 214},
abstract = {<p>A key factor in legal and moral judgments is intent. Intent differentiates, for instance, murder from manslaughter. Is this true for all moral judgments? People deliver moral judgments of many kinds of actions, including harmful actions (e.g., assault) and purity violations (e.g., incest, consuming taboo substances). We show that intent is a key factor for moral judgments of harm, but less of a factor for purity violations. Based on the agent’s innocent intent, participants judged accidental harms less morally wrong than accidental incest; based on the agent’s guilty intent, participants judged failed attempts to harm more morally wrong than failed attempts to commit incest. These patterns were specific to moral judgments versus judgments of the agent’s control, knowledge, or intent, the action’s overall emotional salience, or participants’ ratings of disgust. The current results therefore reveal distinct cognitive signatures of distinct moral domains, and may inform the distinct functional roles of moral norms.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>A key factor in legal and moral judgments is intent. Intent differentiates, for instance, murder from manslaughter. Is this true for all moral judgments? People deliver moral judgments of many kinds of actions, including harmful actions (e.g., assault) and purity violations (e.g., incest, consuming taboo substances). We show that intent is a key factor for moral judgments of harm, but less of a factor for purity violations. Based on the agent’s innocent intent, participants judged accidental harms less morally wrong than accidental incest; based on the agent’s guilty intent, participants judged failed attempts to harm more morally wrong than failed attempts to commit incest. These patterns were specific to moral judgments versus judgments of the agent’s control, knowledge, or intent, the action’s overall emotional salience, or participants’ ratings of disgust. The current results therefore reveal distinct cognitive signatures of distinct moral domains, and may inform the distinct functional roles of moral norms.</p>
Pitcher, David; Dilks, Daniel D.; Saxe, Rebecca R.; Triantafyllou, Christina; Kanwisher, Nancy
Differential selectivity for dynamic versus static information in face-selective cortical regions Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 56, pp. 2356 - 2363, 2011, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{26,
title = {Differential selectivity for dynamic versus static information in face-selective cortical regions},
author = {David Pitcher and Daniel D. Dilks and Rebecca R. Saxe and Christina Triantafyllou and Nancy Kanwisher},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811911003466
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S1053811911003466-main.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.067},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-06-01},
urldate = {2011-06-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {56},
pages = {2356 - 2363},
abstract = {<p>Neuroimaging studies have identified multiple face-selective regions in human cortex but the functional division of labor between these regions is not yet clear. A central hypothesis, with some empirical support, is that face-selective regions in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) are particularly responsive to dynamic information in faces, whereas the fusiform face area (FFA) computes the static or invariant properties of faces. Here we directly tested this hypothesis by measuring the magnitude of response in each region to both dynamic and static stimuli. Consistent with the hypothesis, we found that the response to movies of faces was not significantly different from the response to static images of faces from these same movies in the right FFA and right occipital face area (OFA). By contrast the face-selective region in the right posterior STS (pSTS) responded nearly three times as strongly to dynamic faces as to static faces, and a face-selective region in the right anterior STS (aSTS) responded to dynamic faces only. Both of these regions also responded more strongly to moving faces than to moving bodies, indicating that they are preferentially engaged in processing dynamic information from faces, not in more general processing of any dynamic social stimuli. The response to dynamic and static faces was not significantly different in a third face-selective region in the posterior continuation of the STS (pcSTS). The strong selectivity of face-selective regions in the pSTS and aSTS, but not the FFA, OFA or pcSTS, for dynamic face information demonstrates a clear functional dissociation between different face-selective regions, and provides further clues into their function.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Neuroimaging studies have identified multiple face-selective regions in human cortex but the functional division of labor between these regions is not yet clear. A central hypothesis, with some empirical support, is that face-selective regions in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) are particularly responsive to dynamic information in faces, whereas the fusiform face area (FFA) computes the static or invariant properties of faces. Here we directly tested this hypothesis by measuring the magnitude of response in each region to both dynamic and static stimuli. Consistent with the hypothesis, we found that the response to movies of faces was not significantly different from the response to static images of faces from these same movies in the right FFA and right occipital face area (OFA). By contrast the face-selective region in the right posterior STS (pSTS) responded nearly three times as strongly to dynamic faces as to static faces, and a face-selective region in the right anterior STS (aSTS) responded to dynamic faces only. Both of these regions also responded more strongly to moving faces than to moving bodies, indicating that they are preferentially engaged in processing dynamic information from faces, not in more general processing of any dynamic social stimuli. The response to dynamic and static faces was not significantly different in a third face-selective region in the posterior continuation of the STS (pcSTS). The strong selectivity of face-selective regions in the pSTS and aSTS, but not the FFA, OFA or pcSTS, for dynamic face information demonstrates a clear functional dissociation between different face-selective regions, and provides further clues into their function.</p>
Young, Liane; Scholz, Jonathan; Saxe, Rebecca
Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts Journal Article
In: Social Neuroscience, vol. 6, pp. 302 - 315, 2011, ISSN: 1747-0919.
@article{154,
title = {Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts},
author = {Liane Young and Jonathan Scholz and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470919.2010.529712
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ba449f81abd346189c4657c64c5f1c242ca1.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1080/17470919.2010.529712},
issn = {1747-0919},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-06-01},
urldate = {2011-06-01},
journal = {Social Neuroscience},
volume = {6},
pages = {302 - 315},
abstract = {<p>Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent’s intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent’s intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information.</p>
Cikara, Mina; Bruneau, Emile G; Saxe, Rebecca R
Us and Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy Journal Article
In: Current Directions in Psychological Science, vol. 20, pp. 149 - 153, 2011, ISSN: 0963-7214.
@article{148,
title = {Us and Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy},
author = {Mina Cikara and Emile G Bruneau and Rebecca R Saxe},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0963721411408713
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/70034.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1177/0963721411408713},
issn = {0963-7214},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-06-01},
urldate = {2011-06-01},
journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
volume = {20},
pages = {149 - 153},
abstract = {<p>People are often motivated to increase others’ positive experiences and to alleviate others’ suffering. These tendencies to care about and help one another form the foundation of human society. When the target is an outgroup member, however, people may have powerful motivations not to care about or help ‘the other’. From this perspective, empathic responses are rare and fragile; it is easy to disrupt the chain from perception of suffering, to motivation to alleviate the suffering, to actual helping. We highlight recent interdisciplinary research demonstrating that outgroup members’ suffering elicits dampened empathic responses as compared to ingroup members’ suffering. We consider an alternative to empathy in the context of intergroup competition: Schadenfreude—pleasure at the other&$#$39;s pain. Finally, we review recent investigations of intergroup conflict interventions that attempt to increase empathy for outgroups. We propose that researchers across the range of psychological sciences stand to gain a better understanding of the foundations of empathy by studying its limitations.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>People are often motivated to increase others’ positive experiences and to alleviate others’ suffering. These tendencies to care about and help one another form the foundation of human society. When the target is an outgroup member, however, people may have powerful motivations not to care about or help ‘the other’. From this perspective, empathic responses are rare and fragile; it is easy to disrupt the chain from perception of suffering, to motivation to alleviate the suffering, to actual helping. We highlight recent interdisciplinary research demonstrating that outgroup members’ suffering elicits dampened empathic responses as compared to ingroup members’ suffering. We consider an alternative to empathy in the context of intergroup competition: Schadenfreude—pleasure at the other&$#$39;s pain. Finally, we review recent investigations of intergroup conflict interventions that attempt to increase empathy for outgroups. We propose that researchers across the range of psychological sciences stand to gain a better understanding of the foundations of empathy by studying its limitations.</p>
Whitfield-Gabrieli, Susan; Moran, Joseph M; Nieto-Castañ'on, Alfonso; Triantafyllou, Christina; Saxe, Rebecca; Gabrieli, John D E
Associations and dissociations between default and self-reference networks in the human brain Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 55, pp. 225 - 232, 2011, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{152,
title = {Associations and dissociations between default and self-reference networks in the human brain},
author = {Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Joseph M Moran and Alfonso Nieto-Castañ'on and Christina Triantafyllou and Rebecca Saxe and John D E Gabrieli},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910015260
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NeuroImage-2011-Whitfield-Gabrieli.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.048},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-03-01},
urldate = {2011-03-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {55},
pages = {225 - 232},
abstract = {<p>Neuroimaging has revealed consistent activations in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) extending to precuneus both during explicit self-reference tasks and during rest, a period during which some form of self-reference is assumed to occur in the default mode of brain function. The similarity between these two patterns of midline cortical activation may reflect a common neural system for explicit and default-mode self-reference, but there is little direct evidence about the similarities and differences between the neural systems that mediate explicit self-reference versus default-mode self-reference during rest. In two experiments, we compared directly the brain regions activated by explicit self-reference during judgments about trait adjectives and by rest conditions relative to a semantic task without self-reference. Explicit self-reference preferentially engaged dorsal MPFC, rest preferentially engaged precuneus, and both self-reference and rest commonly engaged ventral MPFC and PCC. These findings indicate that there are both associations (shared components) and dissociations between the neural systems underlying explicit self-reference and the default mode of brain function.</p>},
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pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Neuroimaging has revealed consistent activations in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) extending to precuneus both during explicit self-reference tasks and during rest, a period during which some form of self-reference is assumed to occur in the default mode of brain function. The similarity between these two patterns of midline cortical activation may reflect a common neural system for explicit and default-mode self-reference, but there is little direct evidence about the similarities and differences between the neural systems that mediate explicit self-reference versus default-mode self-reference during rest. In two experiments, we compared directly the brain regions activated by explicit self-reference during judgments about trait adjectives and by rest conditions relative to a semantic task without self-reference. Explicit self-reference preferentially engaged dorsal MPFC, rest preferentially engaged precuneus, and both self-reference and rest commonly engaged ventral MPFC and PCC. These findings indicate that there are both associations (shared components) and dissociations between the neural systems underlying explicit self-reference and the default mode of brain function.</p>
Dodell-Feder, David; Koster-Hale, Jorie; Bedny, Marina; Saxe, Rebecca
fMRI item analysis in a theory of mind task Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 55, pp. 705 - 712, 2011, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{157,
title = {fMRI item analysis in a theory of mind task},
author = {David Dodell-Feder and Jorie Koster-Hale and Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910016241
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S1053811910016241-main.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.040},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-03-01},
urldate = {2011-03-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {55},
pages = {705 - 712},
abstract = {<p>Conventional analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data compare the brain&$#$39;s response to stimulus categories (e.g., pictures of faces, stories about beliefs) across participants. In order to infer that effects observed with the specific items (a particular set of pictures or stories) are generalizable to the entire population (all faces, or all stories about beliefs), it is necessary to perform an “item analysis.” Item analyses may also reveal relationships between secondary (non-hypothesized) features of the items and functional activity. Here, we perform an item analysis on a set of stories commonly used for localizing brain regions putatively involved in Theory of Mind (ToM): right and left temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ/LTPJ), precuneus (PC), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). We address the following questions: Do brain regions that comprise the ToM network respond reliably across items (i.e. different stories about beliefs)? Do these brain regions demonstrate reliable preferences for items within the category? Can we predict any region&$#$39;s response to individual items, by using other features of the stimuli? We find that the ToM network responds reliably to stories about beliefs, generalizing across items as well as subjects. In addition, several regions in the ToM network have reliable preferences for individual items. Linguistic features of the stimuli did not predict these item preferences.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Conventional analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data compare the brain&$#$39;s response to stimulus categories (e.g., pictures of faces, stories about beliefs) across participants. In order to infer that effects observed with the specific items (a particular set of pictures or stories) are generalizable to the entire population (all faces, or all stories about beliefs), it is necessary to perform an “item analysis.” Item analyses may also reveal relationships between secondary (non-hypothesized) features of the items and functional activity. Here, we perform an item analysis on a set of stories commonly used for localizing brain regions putatively involved in Theory of Mind (ToM): right and left temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ/LTPJ), precuneus (PC), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). We address the following questions: Do brain regions that comprise the ToM network respond reliably across items (i.e. different stories about beliefs)? Do these brain regions demonstrate reliable preferences for items within the category? Can we predict any region&$#$39;s response to individual items, by using other features of the stimuli? We find that the ToM network responds reliably to stories about beliefs, generalizing across items as well as subjects. In addition, several regions in the ToM network have reliable preferences for individual items. Linguistic features of the stimuli did not predict these item preferences.</p>
Bedny, M; Pascual-Leone, A; Dodell-Feder, D; Fedorenko, E; Saxe, R
Language processing in the occipital cortex of congenitally blind adults Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, pp. 4429 - 4434, 2011, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{153,
title = {Language processing in the occipital cortex of congenitally blind adults},
author = {M Bedny and A Pascual-Leone and D Dodell-Feder and E Fedorenko and R Saxe},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1014818108
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2011-Bedny.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1014818108},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-03-01},
urldate = {2011-03-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {108},
pages = {4429 - 4434},
abstract = {<p>Humans are thought to have evolved brain regions in the left frontal and temporal cortex that are uniquely capable of language processing. However, congenitally blind individuals also activate the visual cortex in some verbal tasks. We provide evidence that this visual cortex activity in fact reflects language processing. We find that in congenitally blind individuals, the left visual cortex behaves similarly to classic language regions: (\emph{i}) BOLD signal is higher during sentence comprehension than during linguistically degraded control conditions that are more difficult; (\emph{ii}) BOLD signal is modulated by phonological information, lexical semantic information, and sentence-level combinatorial structure; and (\emph{iii}) functional connectivity with language regions in the left prefrontal cortex and thalamus are increased relative to sighted individuals. We conclude that brain regions that are thought to have evolved for vision can take on language processing as a result of early experience. Innate microcircuit properties are not necessary for a brain region to become involved in language processing.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Humans are thought to have evolved brain regions in the left frontal and temporal cortex that are uniquely capable of language processing. However, congenitally blind individuals also activate the visual cortex in some verbal tasks. We provide evidence that this visual cortex activity in fact reflects language processing. We find that in congenitally blind individuals, the left visual cortex behaves similarly to classic language regions: (i) BOLD signal is higher during sentence comprehension than during linguistically degraded control conditions that are more difficult; (ii) BOLD signal is modulated by phonological information, lexical semantic information, and sentence-level combinatorial structure; and (iii) functional connectivity with language regions in the left prefrontal cortex and thalamus are increased relative to sighted individuals. We conclude that brain regions that are thought to have evolved for vision can take on language processing as a result of early experience. Innate microcircuit properties are not necessary for a brain region to become involved in language processing.</p>
Saygin, Zeynep M; Osher, David E; Koldewyn, Kami; Reynolds, Gretchen; Gabrieli, John D E; Saxe, Rebecca R
Anatomical connectivity patterns predict face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus Journal Article
In: Nature Neuroscience, vol. 15, pp. 321 - 327, 2011, ISSN: 1097-6256.
@article{146,
title = {Anatomical connectivity patterns predict face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus},
author = {Zeynep M Saygin and David E Osher and Kami Koldewyn and Gretchen Reynolds and John D E Gabrieli and Rebecca R Saxe},
url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/nn.3001
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nn.3001.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1038/nn.3001},
issn = {1097-6256},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-02-01},
urldate = {2011-02-01},
journal = {Nature Neuroscience},
volume = {15},
pages = {321 - 327},
abstract = {<p>A fundamental assumption in neuroscience is that brain structure determines function. Accordingly, functionally distinct regions of cortex should be structurally distinct in their connections to other areas. We tested this hypothesis in relation to face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus. By using only structural connectivity, as measured through diffusion-weighted imaging, we were able to predict functional activation to faces in the fusiform gyrus. These predictions outperformed two control models and a standard group-average benchmark. The structure-function relationship discovered from the initial participants was highly robust in predicting activation in a second group of participants, despite differences in acquisition parameters and stimuli. This approach can thus reliably estimate activation in participants who cannot perform functional imaging tasks and is an alternative to group-activation maps. Additionally, we identified cortical regions whose connectivity was highly influential in predicting face selectivity within the fusiform, suggesting a possible mechanistic architecture underlying face processing in humans.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>A fundamental assumption in neuroscience is that brain structure determines function. Accordingly, functionally distinct regions of cortex should be structurally distinct in their connections to other areas. We tested this hypothesis in relation to face selectivity in the fusiform gyrus. By using only structural connectivity, as measured through diffusion-weighted imaging, we were able to predict functional activation to faces in the fusiform gyrus. These predictions outperformed two control models and a standard group-average benchmark. The structure–function relationship discovered from the initial participants was highly robust in predicting activation in a second group of participants, despite differences in acquisition parameters and stimuli. This approach can thus reliably estimate activation in participants who cannot perform functional imaging tasks and is an alternative to group-activation maps. Additionally, we identified cortical regions whose connectivity was highly influential in predicting face selectivity within the fusiform, suggesting a possible mechanistic architecture underlying face processing in humans.</p>
Moran, J M; Young, L; Saxe, R; Lee, S M; O’Young, D; Mavros, P L; Gabrieli, J D
Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, pp. 2688 - 2692, 2011, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{151,
title = {Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism},
author = {J M Moran and L Young and R Saxe and S M Lee and D O’Young and P L Mavros and J D Gabrieli},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1011734108},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1011734108},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-02-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {108},
pages = {2688 - 2692},
abstract = {<p>High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person&$#$39;s beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person&$#$39;s actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person&$#$39;s innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action&$#$39;s negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person&$#$39;s beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person&$#$39;s actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person&$#$39;s innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action&$#$39;s negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.</p>
Moran, J M; Young, L; Saxe, R; Lee, S M; O’Young, D; Mavros, P L; Gabrieli, J D
Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, pp. 2688 - 2692, 2011, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{151b,
title = {Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism},
author = {J M Moran and L Young and R Saxe and S M Lee and D O’Young and P L Mavros and J D Gabrieli},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1011734108
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2011-Moran.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1011734108},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-02-01},
urldate = {2011-02-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {108},
pages = {2688 - 2692},
abstract = {<p>High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person&$#$39;s beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person&$#$39;s actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person&$#$39;s innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action&$#$39;s negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person&$#$39;s beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person&$#$39;s actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person&$#$39;s innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action&$#$39;s negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.</p>
Moran, J M; Young, L; Saxe, R; Lee, S M; O’Young, D; Mavros, P L; Gabrieli, J D
Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, pp. 2688 - 2692, 2011, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{151c,
title = {Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism},
author = {J M Moran and L Young and R Saxe and S M Lee and D O’Young and P L Mavros and J D Gabrieli},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1011734108},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1011734108},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-02-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {108},
pages = {2688 - 2692},
abstract = {<p>High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person&$#$39;s beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person&$#$39;s actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person&$#$39;s innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action&$#$39;s negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person&$#$39;s beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person&$#$39;s actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person&$#$39;s innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action&$#$39;s negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.</p>
Young, Liane; Saxe, Rebecca
It’s Not Just What You Do, but What’s on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Experiments in Ethics” Journal Article
In: Neuroethics, vol. 31, pp. 201 - 207, 2010, ISSN: 1874-5490.
@article{160,
title = {It’s Not Just What You Do, but What’s on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Experiments in Ethics”},
author = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12152-010-9066-4
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young_Saxe_review_Appiah.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1007/s12152-010-9066-4},
issn = {1874-5490},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-11-01},
urldate = {2010-11-01},
journal = {Neuroethics},
volume = {31},
pages = {201 - 207},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Bedny, Marina; Konkle, Talia; Pelphrey, Kevin; Saxe, Rebecca; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro
Sensitive Period for a Multimodal Response in Human Visual Motion Area MT/MST Journal Article
In: Current Biology, vol. 20, pp. 1900 - 1906, 2010, ISSN: 09609822.
@article{156,
title = {Sensitive Period for a Multimodal Response in Human Visual Motion Area MT/MST},
author = {Marina Bedny and Talia Konkle and Kevin Pelphrey and Rebecca Saxe and Alvaro Pascual-Leone},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982210011620
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms238983.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2010.09.044},
issn = {09609822},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-11-01},
urldate = {2010-11-01},
journal = {Current Biology},
volume = {20},
pages = {1900 - 1906},
abstract = {<p>The middle temporal complex (MT/MST) is a brain region specialized for the perception of motion in the visual modality [1-4]. However, this specialization is modified by visual experience: following longstanding blindness, MT/MST responds to sound [5]. Recent evidence also suggests that the auditory response of MT/MST is selective for motion [6,7]. The developmental timecourse of this plasticity is not known. To test for a sensitive period in MT/MST development, we compared MT/MST function in congenitally blind, late blind and sighted adults using fMRI. MT/MST responded to sound in congenitally blind adults, but not in late blind or sighted adults, and not in an individual who lost his vision between ages of 2 and 3 years. All blind adults had reduced functional connectivity between MT/MST and other visual regions. Functional connectivity was increased between MT/MST and lateral prefrontal areas in congenitally blind relative to sighted and late blind adults. These data suggest that early blindness affects the function of feedback projections from prefrontal cortex to MT/MST. We conclude that there is a sensitive period for visual specialization in MT/MST. During typical development, early visual experience either maintains or creates a vision-dominated response. Once established, this response profile is not altered by longstanding blindness.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>The middle temporal complex (MT/MST) is a brain region specialized for the perception of motion in the visual modality [1–4]. However, this specialization is modified by visual experience: following longstanding blindness, MT/MST responds to sound [5]. Recent evidence also suggests that the auditory response of MT/MST is selective for motion [6,7]. The developmental timecourse of this plasticity is not known. To test for a sensitive period in MT/MST development, we compared MT/MST function in congenitally blind, late blind and sighted adults using fMRI. MT/MST responded to sound in congenitally blind adults, but not in late blind or sighted adults, and not in an individual who lost his vision between ages of 2 and 3 years. All blind adults had reduced functional connectivity between MT/MST and other visual regions. Functional connectivity was increased between MT/MST and lateral prefrontal areas in congenitally blind relative to sighted and late blind adults. These data suggest that early blindness affects the function of feedback projections from prefrontal cortex to MT/MST. We conclude that there is a sensitive period for visual specialization in MT/MST. During typical development, early visual experience either maintains or creates a vision-dominated response. Once established, this response profile is not altered by longstanding blindness.</p>
Bruneau, Emile G; Saxe, Rebecca
Attitudes towards the outgroup are predicted by activity in the precuneus in Arabs and Israelis Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 52, pp. 1704 - 1711, 2010, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{158,
title = {Attitudes towards the outgroup are predicted by activity in the precuneus in Arabs and Israelis},
author = {Emile G Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910007901
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Attitudes_towards_the_outgroup.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.05.057},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-10-01},
urldate = {2010-10-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {52},
pages = {1704 - 1711},
abstract = {<p>The modern socio-political climate is defined by conflict between ethnic, religious and political groups: Bosnians and Serbs, Tamils and Singhalese, Irish Catholics and Protestants, Israelis and Arabs. One impediment to the resolution of these conflicts is the psychological bias that members of each group harbor towards each other. These biases, and their neural bases, are likely different from the commonly studied biases towards racial outgroups. We presented Arab, Israeli and control individuals with statements about the Middle East from the perspective of the ingroup or the outgroup. Subjects rated how ‘reasonable’ each statement was, during fMRI imaging. Increased activation in the precuneus (PC) while reading pro-outgroup vs. pro-ingroup statements correlated strongly with both explicit and implicit measures of negative attitudes towards the outgroup; other brain regions that were involved in reasoning about emotionally-laden information did not show this pattern.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>The modern socio-political climate is defined by conflict between ethnic, religious and political groups: Bosnians and Serbs, Tamils and Singhalese, Irish Catholics and Protestants, Israelis and Arabs. One impediment to the resolution of these conflicts is the psychological bias that members of each group harbor towards each other. These biases, and their neural bases, are likely different from the commonly studied biases towards racial outgroups. We presented Arab, Israeli and control individuals with statements about the Middle East from the perspective of the ingroup or the outgroup. Subjects rated how ‘reasonable’ each statement was, during fMRI imaging. Increased activation in the precuneus (PC) while reading pro-outgroup vs. pro-ingroup statements correlated strongly with both explicit and implicit measures of negative attitudes towards the outgroup; other brain regions that were involved in reasoning about emotionally-laden information did not show this pattern.</p>
Young, Liane; Nichols, Shaun; Saxe, Rebecca
Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know Journal Article
In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 11, pp. 333 - 349, 2010, ISSN: 1878-5158.
@article{161,
title = {Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know},
author = {Liane Young and Shaun Nichols and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-010-0027-y
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/YOUNG_LUCK_RPP_2010.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1007/s13164-010-0027-y},
issn = {1878-5158},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-09-01},
urldate = {2010-09-01},
journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
volume = {11},
pages = {333 - 349},
abstract = {<p>Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.</p>
Young, Liane; Dodell-Feder, David; Saxe, Rebecca
What gets the attention of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of mind Journal Article
In: Neuropsychologia, vol. 48, pp. 2658 - 2664, 2010, ISSN: 00283932.
@article{159,
title = {What gets the attention of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of attention and theory of mind},
author = {Liane Young and David Dodell-Feder and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393210001934
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young_2010_Neuropsychologia.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.05.012},
issn = {00283932},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-07-01},
urldate = {2010-07-01},
journal = {Neuropsychologia},
volume = {48},
pages = {2658 - 2664},
abstract = {<p>Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated a critical role for a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) in “theory of mind” (ToM), or mental state reasoning. In other research, the RTPJ has been implicated in the deployment of attention to an unexpected stimulus. One hypothesis (“attention hypothesis”) is that patterns of RTPJ activation in ToM tasks can be fully explained by appeal to attention: stimuli that apparently manipulate aspects of ToM are in fact manipulating aspects of attention. On an alternative hypothesis (“ToM hypothesis”), functional regions identified by ToM tasks are selective for ToM, and not just for any unexpected stimulus. Here, we used fMRI to test these competing hypotheses: are brain regions implicated in ToM, including the RTPJ, LTPJ, and precuneus, recruited specifically for mental states, or for any unexpected stimulus?We first identified brain regions implicated in ToM, using a standard paradigm: participants read stories about false beliefs and false physical representations (e.g., outdated photographs). Participants also read a new set of stories describing mental or physical states, which were unexpected or expected. Regions of interest analyses revealed a higher response in the RTPJ, LTPJ, and precuneus, for mental versus physical stories, but no difference for unexpected and expected stories. Whole-brain random effects analyses also revealed higher activation in these regions for mental versus physical stories. This pattern provides evidence for the ToM hypothesis: the response in these functional regions is selective for mental state content, whether that content is unexpected or expected.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated a critical role for a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) in “theory of mind” (ToM), or mental state reasoning. In other research, the RTPJ has been implicated in the deployment of attention to an unexpected stimulus. One hypothesis (“attention hypothesis”) is that patterns of RTPJ activation in ToM tasks can be fully explained by appeal to attention: stimuli that apparently manipulate aspects of ToM are in fact manipulating aspects of attention. On an alternative hypothesis (“ToM hypothesis”), functional regions identified by ToM tasks are selective for ToM, and not just for any unexpected stimulus. Here, we used fMRI to test these competing hypotheses: are brain regions implicated in ToM, including the RTPJ, LTPJ, and precuneus, recruited specifically for mental states, or for any unexpected stimulus?We first identified brain regions implicated in ToM, using a standard paradigm: participants read stories about false beliefs and false physical representations (e.g., outdated photographs). Participants also read a new set of stories describing mental or physical states, which were unexpected or expected. Regions of interest analyses revealed a higher response in the RTPJ, LTPJ, and precuneus, for mental versus physical stories, but no difference for unexpected and expected stories. Whole-brain random effects analyses also revealed higher activation in these regions for mental versus physical stories. This pattern provides evidence for the ToM hypothesis: the response in these functional regions is selective for mental state content, whether that content is unexpected or expected.</p>
Redcay, Elizabeth; Dodell-Feder, David; Pearrow, Mark J; Mavros, Penelope L; Kleiner, Mario; Gabrieli, John D E; Saxe, Rebecca
Live face-to-face interaction during fMRI: A new tool for social cognitive neuroscience Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 50, pp. 1639 - 1647, 2010, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{163,
title = {Live face-to-face interaction during fMRI: A new tool for social cognitive neuroscience},
author = {Elizabeth Redcay and David Dodell-Feder and Mark J Pearrow and Penelope L Mavros and Mario Kleiner and John D E Gabrieli and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811910000741
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Redcay-E.-Dodell-Feder-D.-Pearrow-M.-J.-2010.-Live-face-to-face-interaction-during-fMRI-NeuroImage.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.01.052},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-05-01},
urldate = {2010-05-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {50},
pages = {1639 - 1647},
abstract = {<p>Cooperative social interaction is critical for human social development and learning. Despite the importance of social interaction, previous neuroimaging studies lack two fundamental components of everyday face-toface interactions: contingent responding and joint attention. In the current studies, functional MRI data were collected while participants interacted with a human experimenter face-to-face via live video feed as they engaged in simple cooperative games. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in a live interaction with the experimenter (“Live”) or watched a video of the same interaction (“Recorded”). During the “Live” interaction, as compared to the Recorded conditions, greater activation was seen in brain regions involved in social cognition and reward, including the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), right superior temporal sulcus (rSTS), ventral striatum, and amygdala. Experiment 2 isolated joint attention, a critical component of social interaction. Participants either followed the gaze of the live experimenter to a shared target of attention (“Joint Attention”) or found the target of attention alone while the experimenter was visible but not sharing attention (“Solo Attention”). The right temporoparietal junction and right posterior STS were differentially recruited during Joint, as compared to Solo, attention. These findings suggest the rpSTS and rTPJ are key regions for both social interaction and joint attention. This method of allowing online, contingent social interactions in the scanner could open up new avenues of research in social cognitive neuroscience, both in typical and atypical populations.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Cooperative social interaction is critical for human social development and learning. Despite the importance of social interaction, previous neuroimaging studies lack two fundamental components of everyday face-toface interactions: contingent responding and joint attention. In the current studies, functional MRI data were collected while participants interacted with a human experimenter face-to-face via live video feed as they engaged in simple cooperative games. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in a live interaction with the experimenter (“Live”) or watched a video of the same interaction (“Recorded”). During the “Live” interaction, as compared to the Recorded conditions, greater activation was seen in brain regions involved in social cognition and reward, including the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), right superior temporal sulcus (rSTS), ventral striatum, and amygdala. Experiment 2 isolated joint attention, a critical component of social interaction. Participants either followed the gaze of the live experimenter to a shared target of attention (“Joint Attention”) or found the target of attention alone while the experimenter was visible but not sharing attention (“Solo Attention”). The right temporoparietal junction and right posterior STS were differentially recruited during Joint, as compared to Solo, attention. These findings suggest the rpSTS and rTPJ are key regions for both social interaction and joint attention. This method of allowing online, contingent social interactions in the scanner could open up new avenues of research in social cognitive neuroscience, both in typical and atypical populations.</p>
Young, L; Camprodon, J A; Hauser, M; Pascual-Leone, A; Saxe, R
Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 107, pp. 6753 - 6758, 2010, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{27,
title = {Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments},
author = {L Young and J A Camprodon and M Hauser and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0914826107
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young_2010_PNAS.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.0914826107},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-04-01},
urldate = {2010-04-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {107},
pages = {6753 - 6758},
abstract = {<p>When we judge an action as morally right or wrong, we rely on our capacity to infer the actor’s mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions). Here, we test the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), an area involved in mental state reasoning, is necessary for making moral judgments. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt neural activity in the RTPJ transiently before moral judgment (experiment 1, offline stimulation) and during moral judgment (experiment 2, online stimulation). In both experiments, TMS to the RTPJ led participants to rely less on the actor’s mental states. A particularly striking effect occurred for attempted harms (e.g., actors who intended but failed to do harm): Relative to TMS to a control site, TMS to the RTPJ caused participants to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally permissible. Thus, interfering with activity in the RTPJ disrupts the capacity to use mental states in moral judgment, especially in the case of attempted harms.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>When we judge an action as morally right or wrong, we rely on our capacity to infer the actor’s mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions). Here, we test the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), an area involved in mental state reasoning, is necessary for making moral judgments. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt neural activity in the RTPJ transiently before moral judgment (experiment 1, offline stimulation) and during moral judgment (experiment 2, online stimulation). In both experiments, TMS to the RTPJ led participants to rely less on the actor’s mental states. A particularly striking effect occurred for attempted harms (e.g., actors who intended but failed to do harm): Relative to TMS to a control site, TMS to the RTPJ caused participants to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally permissible. Thus, interfering with activity in the RTPJ disrupts the capacity to use mental states in moral judgment, especially in the case of attempted harms.</p>
Bonawitz, Elizabeth Baraff; Ferranti, Darlene; Saxe, Rebecca; Gopnik, Alison; Meltzoff, Andrew N; Woodward, James; Schulz, Laura E
Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences Journal Article
In: Cognition, vol. 115, pp. 104 - 117, 2010, ISSN: 00100277.
@article{164,
title = {Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences},
author = {Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz and Darlene Ferranti and Rebecca Saxe and Alison Gopnik and Andrew N Meltzoff and James Woodward and Laura E Schulz},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027709002947
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/COGNIT2075.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.12.001},
issn = {00100277},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-04-01},
urldate = {2010-04-01},
journal = {Cognition},
volume = {115},
pages = {104 - 117},
abstract = {<p>Adults’ causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Adults’ causal representations integrate information about predictive relations and the possibility of effective intervention; if one event reliably predicts another, adults can represent the possibility that acting to bring about the first event might generate the second. Here we show that although toddlers (mean age: 24 months) readily learn predictive relationships between physically connected events, they do not spontaneously initiate one event to try to generate the second (although older children, mean age: 47 months, do; Experiments 1 and 2). Toddlers succeed only when the events are initiated by a dispositional agent (Experiment 3), when the events involve direct contact between objects (Experiment 4), or when the events are described using causal language (Experiment 5). This suggests that causal language may help children extend their initial causal representations beyond agent-initiated and direct contact events.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca
The right temporo-parietal junction: a specific brain region for thinking about thoughts Book Chapter
In: Handbook of Theory of Mind, 2010.
@inbook{155,
title = {The right temporo-parietal junction: a specific brain region for thinking about thoughts},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-01-01},
urldate = {2010-01-01},
booktitle = {Handbook of Theory of Mind},
abstract = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_RTPJChapter.pdf, PDF},
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tppubtype = {inbook}
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https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_RTPJChapter.pdf, PDF
Baker, Chris L; Saxe, Rebecca; Tenenbaum, Joshua B
Action understanding as inverse planning Journal Article
In: Cognition, vol. 113, pp. 329 - 349, 2009, ISSN: 00100277.
@article{166,
title = {Action understanding as inverse planning},
author = {Chris L Baker and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua B Tenenbaum},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027709001607
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S0010027709001607-main.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.005},
issn = {00100277},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-12-01},
urldate = {2009-12-01},
journal = {Cognition},
volume = {113},
pages = {329 - 349},
abstract = {<p>Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an ‘‘intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a ‘‘teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an ‘‘intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a ‘‘teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.</p>
Young, Liane; Saxe, Rebecca
Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity* Journal Article
In: Neuropsychologia, vol. 47, pp. 2065 - 2072, 2009, ISSN: 00283932.
@article{173,
title = {Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity*},
author = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393209001560
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S0028393209001560-main.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.03.020},
issn = {00283932},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-08-01},
urldate = {2009-08-01},
journal = {Neuropsychologia},
volume = {47},
pages = {2065 - 2072},
abstract = {<p>Contemporary moral psychology often emphasizes the universality of moral judgments. Across age, gender, religion and ethnicity, people’s judgments on classic dilemmas are sensitive to the same moral principles. In many cases, moral judgments depend not only on the outcome of the action, but on the agent’s beliefs and intentions at the time of action. For example, we blame agents who attempt but fail to harm others, while generally forgiving agents who harm others accidentally and unknowingly. Nevertheless, as we report here, there are individual differences in the extent to which observers exculpate agents for accidental harms. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which innocent intentions are taken to mitigate blame for accidental harms is correlated with activation in a specific brain region during moral judgment. This brain region, the right temporo-parietal junction, has been previously implicated in reasoning about other people’s thoughts, beliefs, and intentions in moral and non-moral contexts.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Contemporary moral psychology often emphasizes the universality of moral judgments. Across age, gender, religion and ethnicity, people’s judgments on classic dilemmas are sensitive to the same moral principles. In many cases, moral judgments depend not only on the outcome of the action, but on the agent’s beliefs and intentions at the time of action. For example, we blame agents who attempt but fail to harm others, while generally forgiving agents who harm others accidentally and unknowingly. Nevertheless, as we report here, there are individual differences in the extent to which observers exculpate agents for accidental harms. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which innocent intentions are taken to mitigate blame for accidental harms is correlated with activation in a specific brain region during moral judgment. This brain region, the right temporo-parietal junction, has been previously implicated in reasoning about other people’s thoughts, beliefs, and intentions in moral and non-moral contexts.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca R; Whitfield-Gabrieli, Susan; Scholz, Jonathan; Pelphrey, Kevin A
Brain Regions for Perceiving and Reasoning About Other People in School-Aged Children Journal Article
In: Child Development, vol. 80, pp. 1197 - 1209, 2009, ISSN: 00093920.
@article{171,
title = {Brain Regions for Perceiving and Reasoning About Other People in School-Aged Children},
author = {Rebecca R Saxe and Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Jonathan Scholz and Kevin A Pelphrey},
url = {http://blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-4
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_etal_2009.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-410.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01325.x},
issn = {00093920},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-07-01},
urldate = {2009-07-01},
journal = {Child Development},
volume = {80},
pages = {1197 - 1209},
abstract = {<p>Neuroimaging studies with adults have identified cortical regions recruited when people think about other people’s thoughts (theory of mind): temporo-parietal junction, posterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex. These same regions were recruited in 13 children aged 6-11 years when they listened to sections of a story describing a character’s thoughts compared to sections of the same story that described the physical context. A distinct region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus was implicated in the perception of biological motion. Change in response selectivity with age was observed in just one region. The right temporo-parietal junction was recruited equally for mental and physical facts about people in younger children, but only for mental facts in older children.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Neuroimaging studies with adults have identified cortical regions recruited when people think about other people’s thoughts (theory of mind): temporo-parietal junction, posterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex. These same regions were recruited in 13 children aged 6–11 years when they listened to sections of a story describing a character’s thoughts compared to sections of the same story that described the physical context. A distinct region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus was implicated in the perception of biological motion. Change in response selectivity with age was observed in just one region. The right temporo–parietal junction was recruited equally for mental and physical facts about people in younger children, but only for mental facts in older children.</p>
Young, Liane; Saxe, Rebecca
An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment Journal Article
In: Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 21, pp. 1396 - 1405, 2009, ISSN: 0898-929X.
@article{174,
title = {An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment},
author = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/jocn.2009.21137
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young-L..-Saxe-R.-2009.-An-fMRI-investigation-of-spontaneous-mental-state-inference-for-moral-judgements-Journal-of-Cognitive-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1162/jocn.2009.21137},
issn = {0898-929X},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-07-01},
urldate = {2009-07-01},
journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
volume = {21},
pages = {1396 - 1405},
abstract = {<p>Human moral judgment depends critically on ‘‘theory of mind,’’ the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent’s beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent’s action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other’s mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist’s action and then either (i) ‘‘moral’’ facts about the action’s effect on another person or (ii) ‘‘nonmoral’’ facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Human moral judgment depends critically on ‘‘theory of mind,’’ the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent’s beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent’s action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other’s mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist’s action and then either (i) ‘‘moral’’ facts about the action’s effect on another person or (ii) ‘‘nonmoral’’ facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.</p>
Bedny, M; Pascual-Leone, A; Saxe, R
Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 106, pp. 11312 - 11317, 2009, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{28,
title = {Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind},
author = {M Bedny and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0900010106
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bedny-M.-Pascual-Leone-A.-Saxe-R.-2009.-Growing-up-blind-does-not-change-the-neural-bases-of-theory-of-mind-PNAS_0.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.0900010106},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-07-01},
urldate = {2009-07-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {106},
pages = {11312 - 11317},
abstract = {<p>Humans reason about the mental states of others; this capacity is called Theory of Mind (ToM). In typically developing adults, ToM is supported by a consistent group of brain regions: the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus (PC), and anterior temporal sulci (aSTS). How experience and intrinsic biological factors interact to produce this adult functional profile is not known. In the current study we investigate the role of visual experience in the development of the ToM network by studying congenitally blind adults. In experiment 1, participants listened to stories and answered true/false questions about them. The stories were either about mental or physical representations of reality (e.g., photographs). In experiment 2, participants listened to stories about people’s beliefs based on seeing or hearing; people’s bodily sensations (e.g., hunger); and control stories without people. Participants judged whether each story had positive or negative valance. We find that ToM brain regions of sighted and congenitally blind adults are similarly localized and functionally specific. In congenitally blind adults, reasoning about mental states leads to activity in bilateral TPJ, MPFC, PC, and aSTS. These brain regions responded more to passages about beliefs than passages about nonbelief representations or passages about bodily sensations. Reasoning about mental states that are based on seeing is furthermore similar in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Despite their different developmental experience, congenitally blind adults have a typical ToM network. We conclude that the development of neural mechanisms for ToM depends on innate factors and on experiences represented at an abstract level, amodally.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Humans reason about the mental states of others; this capacity is called Theory of Mind (ToM). In typically developing adults, ToM is supported by a consistent group of brain regions: the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus (PC), and anterior temporal sulci (aSTS). How experience and intrinsic biological factors interact to produce this adult functional profile is not known. In the current study we investigate the role of visual experience in the development of the ToM network by studying congenitally blind adults. In experiment 1, participants listened to stories and answered true/false questions about them. The stories were either about mental or physical representations of reality (e.g., photographs). In experiment 2, participants listened to stories about people’s beliefs based on seeing or hearing; people’s bodily sensations (e.g., hunger); and control stories without people. Participants judged whether each story had positive or negative valance. We find that ToM brain regions of sighted and congenitally blind adults are similarly localized and functionally specific. In congenitally blind adults, reasoning about mental states leads to activity in bilateral TPJ, MPFC, PC, and aSTS. These brain regions responded more to passages about beliefs than passages about nonbelief representations or passages about bodily sensations. Reasoning about mental states that are based on seeing is furthermore similar in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Despite their different developmental experience, congenitally blind adults have a typical ToM network. We conclude that the development of neural mechanisms for ToM depends on innate factors and on experiences represented at an abstract level, amodally.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca R; Pelphrey, Kevin A
Introduction to a Special Section of Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience Journal Article
In: Child Development, vol. 80, pp. 946 - 951, 2009, ISSN: 00093920.
@article{170,
title = {Introduction to a Special Section of Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience},
author = {Rebecca R Saxe and Kevin A Pelphrey},
url = {http://blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-4
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe_et_al-2009-Child_Development.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1111/cdev.2009.80.issue-410.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01309.x},
issn = {00093920},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-07-01},
urldate = {2009-07-01},
journal = {Child Development},
volume = {80},
pages = {946 - 951},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Saxe, Rebecca
The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is Journal Article
In: Philosophical Studies, vol. 144, pp. 447 - 456, 2009, ISSN: 0031-8116.
@article{168,
title = {The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-009-9353-2
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2009.-The-neural-evidence-for-simulation-is-weaker-than-I-think-you-think-it-is-Philosophical-Studies.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-009-9353-2},
issn = {0031-8116},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-06-01},
urldate = {2009-06-01},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
volume = {144},
pages = {447 - 456},
abstract = {<p>Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual’s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual’s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms.</p>
Scholz, Jonathan; Triantafyllou, Christina; Whitfield-Gabrieli, Susan; Brown, Emery N; Saxe, Rebecca
Distinct Regions of Right Temporo-Parietal Junction Are Selective for Theory of Mind and Exogenous Attention Journal Article
In: PLoS ONE, vol. 4, pp. e4869, 2009.
@article{172,
title = {Distinct Regions of Right Temporo-Parietal Junction Are Selective for Theory of Mind and Exogenous Attention},
author = {Jonathan Scholz and Christina Triantafyllou and Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli and Emery N Brown and Rebecca Saxe},
editor = {Jan Lauwereyns},
url = {http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004869
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Scholz-J.-Triantafyllou-C.-Whitfield-Gabrieli-S.-Brown-E.-N.-Saxe-R.-2009.-Distinct-regions-of-right-temporo-parietal-junction-are-selective-for-theory-of-mind-and-exogenous-attention-PLoS-ONE.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.000486910.1371},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-03-01},
urldate = {2009-03-01},
journal = {PLoS ONE},
volume = {4},
pages = {e4869},
abstract = {<p>In functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) is recruited when participants read stories about people’s thoughts (‘Theory of Mind’). Both fMRI and lesion studies suggest that a region near the RTPJ is associated with attentional reorienting in response to an unexpected stimulus. Do Theory of Mind and attentional reorienting recruit a single population of neurons, or are there two neighboring but distinct neural populations in the RTPJ? One recent study compared these activations, and found evidence consistent with a single common region. However, the apparent overlap may have been due to the low resolution of the previous technique. We tested this hypothesis using a high-resolution protocol, within-subjects analyses, and more powerful statistical methods. Strict conjunction analyses revealed that the area of overlap was small and on the periphery of each activation. In addition, a bootstrap analysis identified a reliable 6-10 mm spatial displacement between the peak activations of the two tasks; the same magnitude and direction of displacement was observed in within-subjects comparisons. In all, these results suggest that there are neighboring but distinct regions within the RTPJ implicated in Theory of Mind and orienting attention.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>In functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, a cortical region in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) is recruited when participants read stories about people’s thoughts (‘Theory of Mind’). Both fMRI and lesion studies suggest that a region near the RTPJ is associated with attentional reorienting in response to an unexpected stimulus. Do Theory of Mind and attentional reorienting recruit a single population of neurons, or are there two neighboring but distinct neural populations in the RTPJ? One recent study compared these activations, and found evidence consistent with a single common region. However, the apparent overlap may have been due to the low resolution of the previous technique. We tested this hypothesis using a high-resolution protocol, within-subjects analyses, and more powerful statistical methods. Strict conjunction analyses revealed that the area of overlap was small and on the periphery of each activation. In addition, a bootstrap analysis identified a reliable 6–10 mm spatial displacement between the peak activations of the two tasks; the same magnitude and direction of displacement was observed in within-subjects comparisons. In all, these results suggest that there are neighboring but distinct regions within the RTPJ implicated in Theory of Mind and orienting attention.</p>
Saxe, R
The happiness of the fish: Evidence for a common theory of one’s own and others’ actions Book Chapter
In: Handbook of imagination and mental simulation, pp. 257-265, Psychology Press, New York, 2009.
@inbook{169,
title = {The happiness of the fish: Evidence for a common theory of one’s own and others’ actions},
author = {R Saxe},
url = {http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-07500-017
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2009.-The-happiness-of-the-fish-Evidence-for-a-common-theory-of-ones-own-and-others-actions-Handbook-of-Imagination-and-Mental-Simulation.pdf, PDF},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
urldate = {2009-01-01},
booktitle = {Handbook of imagination and mental simulation},
pages = {257-265},
publisher = {Psychology Press},
address = {New York},
organization = {Psychology Press},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Saxe, Rebecca
Theory of Mind (Neural Basis) Book Chapter
In: Encyclopedia of Consciousness, 2009.
@inbook{165,
title = {Theory of Mind (Neural Basis)},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-in-press.-Theory-of-mind-neural-basis-Encyclopedia-of-Consciousness.pdf, PDF},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
urldate = {2009-01-01},
booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Consciousness},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
Bedny, M; Caramazza, A; Grossman, E; Pascual-Leone, A; Saxe, R
Concepts Are More than Percepts: The Case of Action Verbs Journal Article
In: Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 28, pp. 11347 - 11353, 2008, ISSN: 0270-6474.
@article{29,
title = {Concepts Are More than Percepts: The Case of Action Verbs},
author = {M Bedny and A Caramazza and E Grossman and A Pascual-Leone and R Saxe},
url = {http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/doi/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3039-08.2008
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bedny-M.-Caramazza-A.-Grossman-E.-Pascual-Leone-A.-Saxe-R.-2008.-Concepts-are-more-than-percepts-the-case-of-action-verbs-The-Journal-of-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3039-08.2008},
issn = {0270-6474},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-10-01},
urldate = {2008-10-01},
journal = {Journal of Neuroscience},
volume = {28},
pages = {11347 - 11353},
abstract = {<p>Several regions of the posterior-lateral-temporal cortex (PLTC) are reliably recruited when participants read or listen to action verbs, relative to other word and nonword types. This PLTC activation is generally interpreted as reflecting the retrieval of visual-motion features of actions. This interpretation supports the broader theory, that concepts are comprised of sensory-motor features. We investigated an alternative interpretation of the same activations: PLTC activity for action verbs reflects the retrieval of modality-independent representations of event concepts, or the grammatical types associated with them, i.e., verbs. During a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan, participants made semantic-relatedness judgments on word pairs varying in amount of visual-motion information. Replicating previous results, several PLTC regions showed higher responses to words that describe actions versus objects. However, we found that these PLTC regions did not overlap with visual-motion regions. Moreover, their response was higher for verbs than nouns, regardless of visual-motion features. For example, the response of the PLTC is equally high to action verbs (e.g., to run) and mental verbs (e.g., to think), and equally low to animal nouns (e.g., the cat) and inanimate natural kind nouns (e.g., the rock). Thus, PLTC activity for action verbs might reflect the retrieval of event concepts, or the grammatical information associated with verbs. We conclude that concepts are abstracted away from sensory-motor experience and organized according to conceptual properties.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Several regions of the posterior-lateral-temporal cortex (PLTC) are reliably recruited when participants read or listen to action verbs, relative to other word and nonword types. This PLTC activation is generally interpreted as reflecting the retrieval of visual-motion features of actions. This interpretation supports the broader theory, that concepts are comprised of sensory–motor features. We investigated an alternative interpretation of the same activations: PLTC activity for action verbs reflects the retrieval of modality-independent representations of event concepts, or the grammatical types associated with them, i.e., verbs. During a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan, participants made semantic-relatedness judgments on word pairs varying in amount of visual-motion information. Replicating previous results, several PLTC regions showed higher responses to words that describe actions versus objects. However, we found that these PLTC regions did not overlap with visual-motion regions. Moreover, their response was higher for verbs than nouns, regardless of visual-motion features. For example, the response of the PLTC is equally high to action verbs (e.g., to run) and mental verbs (e.g., to think), and equally low to animal nouns (e.g., the cat) and inanimate natural kind nouns (e.g., the rock). Thus, PLTC activity for action verbs might reflect the retrieval of event concepts, or the grammatical information associated with verbs. We conclude that concepts are abstracted away from sensory–motor experience and organized according to conceptual properties.</p>
Kliemann, Dorit; Young, Liane; Scholz, Jonathan; Saxe, Rebecca
The influence of prior record on moral judgment Journal Article
In: Neuropsychologia, vol. 46, pp. 2949 - 2957, 2008, ISSN: 00283932.
@article{176,
title = {The influence of prior record on moral judgment},
author = {Dorit Kliemann and Liane Young and Jonathan Scholz and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393208002613
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms503631.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.06.010},
issn = {00283932},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-10-01},
urldate = {2008-10-01},
journal = {Neuropsychologia},
volume = {46},
pages = {2949 - 2957},
abstract = {<p>Repeat offenders are commonly given more severe sentences than first-time offenders for the same violations. Though this practice makes intuitive sense, the theory behind escalating penalties is disputed in both legal and economic theories. Here we investigate folk intuitions concerning the moral and intentional status of actions performed by people with positive versus negative prior records. We hypothesized that prior record would modulate both moral judgment and mental state reasoning. Subjects first engaged in an economic game with fair (positive prior record) and unfair (negative prior record) competitors and then read descriptions of their competitors’ actions that resulted in either positive or negative outcomes. The descriptions left the competitors’ mental states unstated. We found that subjects judged actions producing negative outcomes as more “intentional” and more “blameworthy” when performed by unfair competitors. Although explicit mental state evaluation was not required, moral judgments in this case were accompanied by increased activation in brain regions associated with mental state reasoning, including predominantly the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). The magnitude of RTPJ activation was correlated with individual subjects’ behavioural responses to unfair play in the game. These results thus provide insight for both legal theory and moral psychology.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Repeat offenders are commonly given more severe sentences than first-time offenders for the same violations. Though this practice makes intuitive sense, the theory behind escalating penalties is disputed in both legal and economic theories. Here we investigate folk intuitions concerning the moral and intentional status of actions performed by people with positive versus negative prior records. We hypothesized that prior record would modulate both moral judgment and mental state reasoning. Subjects first engaged in an economic game with fair (positive prior record) and unfair (negative prior record) competitors and then read descriptions of their competitors’ actions that resulted in either positive or negative outcomes. The descriptions left the competitors’ mental states unstated. We found that subjects judged actions producing negative outcomes as more “intentional” and more “blameworthy” when performed by unfair competitors. Although explicit mental state evaluation was not required, moral judgments in this case were accompanied by increased activation in brain regions associated with mental state reasoning, including predominantly the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). The magnitude of RTPJ activation was correlated with individual subjects’ behavioural responses to unfair play in the game. These results thus provide insight for both legal theory and moral psychology.</p>
Young, Liane; Saxe, Rebecca
The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 40, pp. 1912 - 1920, 2008, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{177,
title = {The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment},
author = {Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811908000876
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S1053811908000876-main.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.057},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-05-01},
urldate = {2008-05-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {40},
pages = {1912 - 1920},
abstract = {<p>Moral judgment in the mature state depends on “theory of mind”, or the capacity to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) to moral agents. The current study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the cognitive processes for belief attribution in moral judgment. Participants read vignettes in a 2× 2× 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome, based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome or the neutral outcome; presentation of belief information either preceded or followed outcome information. In each case, participants judged the moral permissibility of the action. The results indicate that while the medial prefrontal cortex is recruited for processing belief valence, the temporo-parietal junction and precuneus are recruited for processing beliefs in moral judgment via two distinct component processes: (1) encoding beliefs and (2) integrating beliefs with other relevant features of the action (e.g., the outcome) for moral judgment.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Moral judgment in the mature state depends on “theory of mind”, or the capacity to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) to moral agents. The current study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the cognitive processes for belief attribution in moral judgment. Participants read vignettes in a 2× 2× 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome, based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome or the neutral outcome; presentation of belief information either preceded or followed outcome information. In each case, participants judged the moral permissibility of the action. The results indicate that while the medial prefrontal cortex is recruited for processing belief valence, the temporo-parietal junction and precuneus are recruited for processing beliefs in moral judgment via two distinct component processes: (1) encoding beliefs and (2) integrating beliefs with other relevant features of the action (e.g., the outcome) for moral judgment.</p>
Baker, Chris L; Tenenbaum, J B; Saxe, Rebecca
Goal Inference as Inverse Planning Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, vol. 29, pp. 779 - 784, 2007.
@article{178,
title = {Goal Inference as Inverse Planning},
author = {Chris L Baker and J B Tenenbaum and Rebecca Saxe},
url = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5v06n97q
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/qt5v06n97q.pdf, PDF},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-10-01},
urldate = {2007-10-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},
volume = {29},
pages = {779 - 784},
abstract = {<p>Infants and adults are adept at inferring agents’ goals from incomplete or ambiguous sequences of behavior. We propose a framework for goal inference based on inverse planning, in which observers invert a probabilistic generative model of goal-dependent plans to infer agents’ goals. The inverse planning framework encompasses many specific models and representations; we present several specific models and test them in two behavioral experiments on online and retrospective goal inference.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Infants and adults are adept at inferring agents’ goals from incomplete or ambiguous sequences of behavior. We propose a framework for goal inference based on inverse planning, in which observers invert a probabilistic generative model of goal-dependent plans to infer agents’ goals. The inverse planning framework encompasses many specific models and representations; we present several specific models and test them in two behavioral experiments on online and retrospective goal inference.</p>
Young, L; Cushman, F; Hauser, M; Saxe, R
The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment Journal Article
In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 104, pp. 8235 - 8240, 2007, ISSN: 0027-8424.
@article{180,
title = {The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment},
author = {L Young and F Cushman and M Hauser and R Saxe},
url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0701408104
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Young-L.-Cushman-F.-Hauser-M.-Saxe-R.-2007-The-neural-basis-of-the-interaction-between-theory-of-mind-and-moral-judgment-PNAS.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.0701408104},
issn = {0027-8424},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-05-01},
urldate = {2007-05-01},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
volume = {104},
pages = {8235 - 8240},
abstract = {<p>Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent’s beliefs and an action’s consequences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior developmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differentially to the young child’s moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in belief attribution. Participants read vignettes in a 2 ! 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome (‘‘negative’’ belief) or the neutral outcome (‘‘neutral’’ belief). The RTPJ showed significant activation above baseline for all four conditions but was modulated by an interaction between belief and outcome. Specifically, the RTPJ response was highest for cases of attempted harm, where protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to others, even though the harm did not occur. The results not only suggest a general role for belief attribution during moral judgment, but also add detail to our understanding of the interaction between these processes at both the neural and behavioral levels.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent’s beliefs and an action’s consequences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior developmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differentially to the young child’s moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in belief attribution. Participants read vignettes in a 2 ! 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome (‘‘negative’’ belief) or the neutral outcome (‘‘neutral’’ belief). The RTPJ showed significant activation above baseline for all four conditions but was modulated by an interaction between belief and outcome. Specifically, the RTPJ response was highest for cases of attempted harm, where protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to others, even though the harm did not occur. The results not only suggest a general role for belief attribution during moral judgment, but also add detail to our understanding of the interaction between these processes at both the neural and behavioral levels.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Tzelnic, Tania; Carey, Susan
Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction. Journal Article
In: Developmental Psychology, vol. 43, pp. 149 - 158, 2007, ISSN: 0012-1649.
@article{179,
title = {Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction.},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Tania Tzelnic and Susan Carey},
url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.149
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Tzelnic-T.-Carey-S.-2007.-Knowing-who-dunnit-infants-identify-the-causal-agent-in-an-unseen-causal-interaction-Developmental-Psychology_0.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.149},
issn = {0012-1649},
year = {2007},
date = {2007-01-01},
urldate = {2007-01-01},
journal = {Developmental Psychology},
volume = {43},
pages = {149 - 158},
abstract = {<p>Preverbal infants can represent the causal structure of events, including distinguishing the agentive and receptive roles and categorizing entities according to stable causal dispositions. This study investigated how infants combine these 2 kinds of causal inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 9.5-month-olds used the position of a human hand or a novel puppet (causal agents), but not a toy train (an inert object), to predict the subsequent motion of a beanbag. Conversely, in Experiment 3, 10- and 7-month-olds used the motion of the beanbag to infer the position of a hand but not of a toy block. These data suggest that preverbal infants expect a causal agent as the source of motion of an inert object.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Preverbal infants can represent the causal structure of events, including distinguishing the agentive and receptive roles and categorizing entities according to stable causal dispositions. This study investigated how infants combine these 2 kinds of causal inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 9.5-month-olds used the position of a human hand or a novel puppet (causal agents), but not a toy train (an inert object), to predict the subsequent motion of a beanbag. Conversely, in Experiment 3, 10- and 7-month-olds used the motion of the beanbag to infer the position of a hand but not of a toy block. These data suggest that preverbal infants expect a causal agent as the source of motion of an inert object.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Moran, Joseph M; Scholz, Jonathan; Gabrieli, John
Overlapping and non-overlapping brain regions for theory of mind and self reflection in individual subjects Journal Article
In: Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, vol. 115, pp. 229 - 234, 2006, ISSN: 1749-5016.
@article{191,
title = {Overlapping and non-overlapping brain regions for theory of mind and self reflection in individual subjects},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Joseph M Moran and Jonathan Scholz and John Gabrieli},
url = {https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/scan/nsl034
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Moran-J.-Scholz-J.-Gabrieli-J.-2006-Overlapping-and-non-overlapping-brain-regions-for-theory-of-mind-and-self-reflection-in-individual-subjects-Social-Cognitive-and-Affective-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF
},
doi = {10.1093/scan/nsl034},
issn = {1749-5016},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-12-01},
urldate = {2006-12-01},
journal = {Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience},
volume = {115},
pages = {229 - 234},
abstract = {<p>When subjects are required to reason about someone’s false belief, a consistent pattern of brain regions are recruited including the medial prefrontal cortex, medial precuneus and bilateral temporo-parietal junction. Previous group analyses suggest that the two medial regions, but not the lateral regions, are also recruited when subjects engage in self-reflection. The current study directly compared the results of the ‘false belief’ and ‘self’ tasks in individual subjects. Consistent with previous reports, the medial prefrontal and medial precuneus regions recruited by the two tasks significantly overlap in individual subjects, although there was also evidence for non-overlapping voxels in medial regions. The temporo-parietal regions are only recruited for the ‘theory of mind’ task. Six possible models of the relationship between theory of mind, self-reflection and autobiographical memory, all consistent with both neurobiological and developmental evidence to date, are discussed.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>When subjects are required to reason about someone’s false belief, a consistent pattern of brain regions are recruited including the medial prefrontal cortex, medial precuneus and bilateral temporo-parietal junction. Previous group analyses suggest that the two medial regions, but not the lateral regions, are also recruited when subjects engage in self-reflection. The current study directly compared the results of the ‘false belief’ and ‘self’ tasks in individual subjects. Consistent with previous reports, the medial prefrontal and medial precuneus regions recruited by the two tasks significantly overlap in individual subjects, although there was also evidence for non-overlapping voxels in medial regions. The temporo-parietal regions are only recruited for the ‘theory of mind’ task. Six possible models of the relationship between theory of mind, self-reflection and autobiographical memory, all consistent with both neurobiological and developmental evidence to date, are discussed.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Carey, Susan
The perception of causality in infancy Journal Article
In: Acta Psychologica, vol. 123, pp. 144 - 165, 2006, ISSN: 00016918.
@article{188,
title = {The perception of causality in infancy},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Susan Carey},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0001691806000710
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Carey-S.-2006.-The-perception-of-Causality-in-Infancy-Acta-Psychologica.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.05.005},
issn = {00016918},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-09-01},
urldate = {2006-09-01},
journal = {Acta Psychologica},
volume = {123},
pages = {144 - 165},
abstract = {<p>Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Michotte proposed a rationalist theory of the origin of the human capacity to represent causal relations among events. He suggested that the input analyzer that underlies the causal perception in launching, entraining, and expulsion events is innate and is the ultimate source of all causal representations. We review the literature on infant causal representations, providing evidence that launching, entraining and expulsion events are interpreted causally by young infants. However, there is as of yet no good evidence that these representations are innate. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that these representations are not the sole source of the human capacity for causal representation.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Schulz, Laura E; Jiang, Yuhong V
Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain Journal Article
In: Social Neuroscience, vol. 1, pp. 284 - 298, 2006, ISSN: 1747-0919.
@article{192,
title = {Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Laura E Schulz and Yuhong V Jiang},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470910601000446
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Schulz-L.-Jiang-Y.-2006.-Reading-Minds-versus-Following-Rules-Social-Neuroscience.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1080/17470910601000446},
issn = {1747-0919},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-09-01},
urldate = {2006-09-01},
journal = {Social Neuroscience},
volume = {1},
pages = {284 - 298},
abstract = {<p>The false belief task commonly used in the study of theory of mind (ToM) requires participants to select among competing responses and inhibit prepotent responses, giving rise to three possibilities: (1) the false belief tasks might require only executive function abilities and there may be no domain-specific component; (2) executive control might be necessary for the emergence of ToM in development but play no role in adult mental state inferences; and (3) executive control and domain-specific ToM abilities might both be implicated. We used fMRI in healthy adults to dissociate these possibilities. We found that non-overlapping brain regions were implicated selectively in response selection and belief attribution, that belief attribution tasks recruit brain regions associated with response selection as much as well-matched control tasks, and that regions associated with ToM (e.g., the right temporo-parietal junction) were implicated only in the belief attribution tasks. These results suggest that both domain-general and domain-specific cognitive resources are involved in adult ToM.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>The false belief task commonly used in the study of theory of mind (ToM) requires participants to select among competing responses and inhibit prepotent responses, giving rise to three possibilities: (1) the false belief tasks might require only executive function abilities and there may be no domain-specific component; (2) executive control might be necessary for the emergence of ToM in development but play no role in adult mental state inferences; and (3) executive control and domain-specific ToM abilities might both be implicated. We used fMRI in healthy adults to dissociate these possibilities. We found that non-overlapping brain regions were implicated selectively in response selection and belief attribution, that belief attribution tasks recruit brain regions associated with response selection as much as well-matched control tasks, and that regions associated with ToM (e.g., the right temporo-parietal junction) were implicated only in the belief attribution tasks. These results suggest that both domain-general and domain-specific cognitive resources are involved in adult ToM.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Powell, Lindsey J
It’s the Thought That Counts Journal Article
In: Psychological Science, vol. 17, pp. 692 - 699, 2006, ISSN: 0956-7976.
@article{189,
title = {It’s the Thought That Counts},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Lindsey J Powell},
url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01768.x
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Powell-L.-2006.-Its-the-thought-that-counts-Psychological-Science.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01768.x},
issn = {0956-7976},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-08-01},
urldate = {2006-08-01},
journal = {Psychological Science},
volume = {17},
pages = {692 - 699},
abstract = {<p>Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that representing the contents of other people’s thoughts and beliefs depends on a component of reasoning about other minds (theory of mind) that is distinct from the earlier-developing mental-state concepts for goals, perceptions, and feelings. To provide converging evidence, the current study investigated the substrate of the late-developing process in adult brains. Three regions—the right and left temporo-parietal junction and the posterior cingulate—responded selectively when subjects read about a protagonist’s thoughts, but not when they read about other subjective, internal states or other socially relevant information about a person. By contrast, the medial prefrontal cortex responded equivalently in all of these story conditions, a result consistent with a broader role for medial prefrontal cortex in general social cognition. These data support the hypothesis that the early- and late-developing components of theory of mind rely on separate psychological and neural mechanisms, and that these mechanisms remain distinct into adulthood.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that representing the contents of other people’s thoughts and beliefs depends on a component of reasoning about other minds (theory of mind) that is distinct from the earlier-developing mental-state concepts for goals, perceptions, and feelings. To provide converging evidence, the current study investigated the substrate of the late-developing process in adult brains. Three regions—the right and left temporo-parietal junction and the posterior cingulate—responded selectively when subjects read about a protagonist’s thoughts, but not when they read about other subjective, internal states or other socially relevant information about a person. By contrast, the medial prefrontal cortex responded equivalently in all of these story conditions, a result consistent with a broader role for medial prefrontal cortex in general social cognition. These data support the hypothesis that the early- and late-developing components of theory of mind rely on separate psychological and neural mechanisms, and that these mechanisms remain distinct into adulthood.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Brett, Matthew; Kanwisher, Nancy
Divide and conquer: A defense of functional localizers Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 30, pp. 1088 - 1096, 2006, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{31,
title = {Divide and conquer: A defense of functional localizers},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Matthew Brett and Nancy Kanwisher},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811905025796
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Brett-M.-Kanwisher-N.-2006.-Divide-and-Conquer-a-defense-of-functional-localizers-Neuroimage.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.062},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-05-01},
urldate = {2006-05-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {30},
pages = {1088 - 1096},
abstract = {<p>Numerous functionally distinct regions of cortex (e.g., V1, MT, the fusiform face area) can be easily identified in any normal human subject in just a few minutes of fMRI scanning. However, the locations of these regions vary across subjects. Investigations of these regions have therefore often used a functional region of interest (fROI) approach in which the region is first identified functionally in each subject individually, before subsequent scans in the same subjects test specific hypotheses concerning that region. This fROI method, which resembled long-established practice in visual neurophysiology, has methodological, statistical, and theoretical advantages over standard alternatives (such as whole-brain analyses of group data): (i) because functional properties are more consistently and robustly associated with fROIs than with locations in stereotaxic space, functional hypotheses concerning fROIs are often the most straightforward to frame, motivate, and test, (ii) because hypotheses are tested in only a handful of fROIs (instead of in tens of thousands of voxels), advance specification of fROIs provides a massive increase in statistical power over whole-brain analyses, and (iii) some fROIs may serve as candidate distinct components of the mind/brain worth investigation as such. Of course fROIs can be productively used in conjunction with other complementary methods. Here, we explain the motivation for and advantages of the fROI approach, and we rebut the criticism of this method offered by Friston et al. (Friston, K., Rotshtein, P., Geng, J., Sterzer, P., Henson, R., in press. A critique of functional localizers. NeuroImage).</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Numerous functionally distinct regions of cortex (e.g., V1, MT, the fusiform face area) can be easily identified in any normal human subject in just a few minutes of fMRI scanning. However, the locations of these regions vary across subjects. Investigations of these regions have therefore often used a functional region of interest (fROI) approach in which the region is first identified functionally in each subject individually, before subsequent scans in the same subjects test specific hypotheses concerning that region. This fROI method, which resembled long-established practice in visual neurophysiology, has methodological, statistical, and theoretical advantages over standard alternatives (such as whole-brain analyses of group data): (i) because functional properties are more consistently and robustly associated with fROIs than with locations in stereotaxic space, functional hypotheses concerning fROIs are often the most straightforward to frame, motivate, and test, (ii) because hypotheses are tested in only a handful of fROIs (instead of in tens of thousands of voxels), advance specification of fROIs provides a massive increase in statistical power over whole-brain analyses, and (iii) some fROIs may serve as candidate distinct components of the mind/brain worth investigation as such. Of course fROIs can be productively used in conjunction with other complementary methods. Here, we explain the motivation for and advantages of the fROI approach, and we rebut the criticism of this method offered by Friston et al. (Friston, K., Rotshtein, P., Geng, J., Sterzer, P., Henson, R., in press. A critique of functional localizers. NeuroImage).</p>
Saxe, Rebecca; Jamal, Nasheed; Powell, Lindsey
My Body or Yours? The Effect of Visual Perspective on Cortical Body Representations Journal Article
In: Cerebral Cortex, vol. 16, pp. 178 - 182, 2006, ISSN: 1047-3211.
@article{190,
title = {My Body or Yours? The Effect of Visual Perspective on Cortical Body Representations},
author = {Rebecca Saxe and Nasheed Jamal and Lindsey Powell},
url = {http://academic.oup.com/cercor/article/16/2/178/281499/My-Body-or-Yours-The-Effect-of-Visual-Perspective
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bhi095.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1093/cercor/bhi095},
issn = {1047-3211},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-04-01},
urldate = {2006-04-01},
journal = {Cerebral Cortex},
volume = {16},
pages = {178 - 182},
abstract = {<p>A human body part, such as a foot, may be observed from an egocentric perspective (consistent with looking at one’s own body, e.g. top of the foot, toes pointing up) or from an allocentric perspective (only consistent with looking at someone else, e.g. top of the foot, toes pointing downwards). We found that the right extrastriate body area (EBA) response to images of body parts was enhanced for body parts presented from an allocentric perspective. Other areas of extrastriate cortex which responded robustly to images of bodies, including the right lateral occipital complex, right MT and left EBA, nevertheless did not distinguish between the two perspectives. A region of primary somatosensory cortex showed the reverse selectivity: the blood oxygen level-dependent response to body parts presented from an allocentric perspective was suppressed. These results help to illuminate the integration of visual and tactile information by which the brain identifies seen body parts as belonging to the self or to another person.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>A human body part, such as a foot, may be observed from an egocentric perspective (consistent with looking at one’s own body, e.g. top of the foot, toes pointing up) or from an allocentric perspective (only consistent with looking at someone else, e.g. top of the foot, toes pointing downwards). We found that the right extrastriate body area (EBA) response to images of body parts was enhanced for body parts presented from an allocentric perspective. Other areas of extrastriate cortex which responded robustly to images of bodies, including the right lateral occipital complex, right MT and left EBA, nevertheless did not distinguish between the two perspectives. A region of primary somatosensory cortex showed the reverse selectivity: the blood oxygen level-dependent response to body parts presented from an allocentric perspective was suppressed. These results help to illuminate the integration of visual and tactile information by which the brain identifies seen body parts as belonging to the self or to another person.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca
Uniquely human social cognition Journal Article
In: Current Opinion in Neurobiology, vol. 16, pp. 235 - 239, 2006, ISSN: 09594388.
@article{186,
title = {Uniquely human social cognition},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0959438806000262
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2006.-Uniquely-Human-Social-Cognition-Current-Opinion-in-Neurobiology.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.001},
issn = {09594388},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-04-01},
urldate = {2006-04-01},
journal = {Current Opinion in Neurobiology},
volume = {16},
pages = {235 - 239},
abstract = {<p>Recent data identify distinct components of social cognition associated with five brain regions. In posterior temporal cortex, the extrastriate body area is associated with perceiving the form of other human bodies. A nearby region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus is involved in interpreting the motions of a human body in terms of goals. A distinct region at the temporo-parietal junction supports the uniquely human ability to reason about the contents of mental states. Medial prefrontal cortex is divided into at least two subregions. Ventral medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in emotional empathy, whereas dorsal medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in the uniquely human representation of triadic relations between two minds and an object, supporting shared attention and collaborative goals.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Recent data identify distinct components of social cognition associated with five brain regions. In posterior temporal cortex, the extrastriate body area is associated with perceiving the form of other human bodies. A nearby region in the posterior superior temporal sulcus is involved in interpreting the motions of a human body in terms of goals. A distinct region at the temporo-parietal junction supports the uniquely human ability to reason about the contents of mental states. Medial prefrontal cortex is divided into at least two subregions. Ventral medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in emotional empathy, whereas dorsal medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in the uniquely human representation of triadic relations between two minds and an object, supporting shared attention and collaborative goals.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca
Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI Journal Article
In: Brain Research, vol. 1079, pp. 57 - 65, 2006, ISSN: 00068993.
@article{187,
title = {Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0006899306000114
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.001},
issn = {00068993},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-03-01},
urldate = {2006-03-01},
journal = {Brain Research},
volume = {1079},
pages = {57 - 65},
abstract = {<p>Social cognitive neuroscience investigates the psychological and neural basis of perception and reasoning about other people, especially in terms of invisible internal states. This enterprise poses many challenges. The current review describes responses to three such challenges: deriving hypotheses from developmental psychology, using verbal narratives as stimuli, and analysing the results in functionally defined regions of interest.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>Social cognitive neuroscience investigates the psychological and neural basis of perception and reasoning about other people, especially in terms of invisible internal states. This enterprise poses many challenges. The current review describes responses to three such challenges: deriving hypotheses from developmental psychology, using verbal narratives as stimuli, and analysing the results in functionally defined regions of interest.</p>
Baker, Chris L; Tenenbaum, Josh B; Saxe, Rebecca R
Bayesian models of human action understanding Journal Article
In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 18, pp. 99 - 106, 2006.
@article{185,
title = {Bayesian models of human action understanding},
author = {Chris L Baker and Josh B Tenenbaum and Rebecca R Saxe},
url = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Baker-C.L.-Tenenbaum-J.B.-Saxe-R.R.-2006.-Bayesian-models-of-human-action-understanding-Advances-in-Neural-Information-Processing-Systems-18.pdf, PDF},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-01-01},
urldate = {2006-01-01},
journal = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},
volume = {18},
pages = {99 - 106},
abstract = {<p>We present a Bayesian framework for explaining how people reason about and predict the actions of an intentional agent, based on observing its behavior. Action-understanding is cast as a problem of inverting a probabilistic generative model, which assumes that agents tend to act rationally in order to achieve their goals given the constraints of their environment. Working in a simple sprite-world domain, we show how this model can be used to infer the goal of an agent and predict how the agent will act in novel situations or when environmental constraints change. The model provides a qualitative account of several kinds of inferences that preverbal infants have been shown to perform, and also fits quantitative predictions that adult observers make in a new experiment.</p>},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
<p>We present a Bayesian framework for explaining how people reason about and predict the actions of an intentional agent, based on observing its behavior. Action-understanding is cast as a problem of inverting a probabilistic generative model, which assumes that agents tend to act rationally in order to achieve their goals given the constraints of their environment. Working in a simple sprite-world domain, we show how this model can be used to infer the goal of an agent and predict how the agent will act in novel situations or when environmental constraints change. The model provides a qualitative account of several kinds of inferences that preverbal infants have been shown to perform, and also fits quantitative predictions that adult observers make in a new experiment.</p>
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