Publications
All accompanying preregistration, data, and supplemental materials under “Links”
Saxe, Rebecca
Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI Journal Article
In: Brain Research, vol. 1079, pp. 57 - 65, 2006, ISSN: 00068993.
@article{187,
title = {Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0006899306000114
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.001},
issn = {00068993},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-03-01},
urldate = {2006-03-01},
journal = {Brain Research},
volume = {1079},
pages = {57 - 65},
abstract = {<p>Social cognitive neuroscience investigates the psychological and neural basis of perception and reasoning about other people, especially in terms of invisible internal states. This enterprise poses many challenges. The current review describes responses to three such challenges: deriving hypotheses from developmental psychology, using verbal narratives as stimuli, and analysing the results in functionally defined regions of interest.</p>},
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<p>Social cognitive neuroscience investigates the psychological and neural basis of perception and reasoning about other people, especially in terms of invisible internal states. This enterprise poses many challenges. The current review describes responses to three such challenges: deriving hypotheses from developmental psychology, using verbal narratives as stimuli, and analysing the results in functionally defined regions of interest.</p>
Baker, Chris L; Tenenbaum, Josh B; Saxe, Rebecca R
Bayesian models of human action understanding Journal Article
In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 18, pp. 99 - 106, 2006.
@article{185,
title = {Bayesian models of human action understanding},
author = {Chris L Baker and Josh B Tenenbaum and Rebecca R Saxe},
url = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Baker-C.L.-Tenenbaum-J.B.-Saxe-R.R.-2006.-Bayesian-models-of-human-action-understanding-Advances-in-Neural-Information-Processing-Systems-18.pdf, PDF},
year = {2006},
date = {2006-01-01},
urldate = {2006-01-01},
journal = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems},
volume = {18},
pages = {99 - 106},
abstract = {<p>We present a Bayesian framework for explaining how people reason about and predict the actions of an intentional agent, based on observing its behavior. Action-understanding is cast as a problem of inverting a probabilistic generative model, which assumes that agents tend to act rationally in order to achieve their goals given the constraints of their environment. Working in a simple sprite-world domain, we show how this model can be used to infer the goal of an agent and predict how the agent will act in novel situations or when environmental constraints change. The model provides a qualitative account of several kinds of inferences that preverbal infants have been shown to perform, and also fits quantitative predictions that adult observers make in a new experiment.</p>},
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<p>We present a Bayesian framework for explaining how people reason about and predict the actions of an intentional agent, based on observing its behavior. Action-understanding is cast as a problem of inverting a probabilistic generative model, which assumes that agents tend to act rationally in order to achieve their goals given the constraints of their environment. Working in a simple sprite-world domain, we show how this model can be used to infer the goal of an agent and predict how the agent will act in novel situations or when environmental constraints change. The model provides a qualitative account of several kinds of inferences that preverbal infants have been shown to perform, and also fits quantitative predictions that adult observers make in a new experiment.</p>
Heberlein, Andrea S.; Saxe, Rebecca R.
Dissociation between emotion and personality judgments: Convergent evidence from functional neuroimaging Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 28, pp. 770 - 777, 2005, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{32,
title = {Dissociation between emotion and personality judgments: Convergent evidence from functional neuroimaging},
author = {Andrea S. Heberlein and Rebecca R. Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811905004568
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Heberlein-A.-Saxe-R.-2005.-Dissociation-between-emotion-and-personality-judgments-Convergent-evidence-from-functional-neuroimaging-Neuroimage.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.06.064},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-12-01},
urldate = {2005-12-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {28},
pages = {770 - 777},
abstract = {<p>Cognitive neuroscientists widely agree on the importance of providing convergent evidence from neuroimaging and lesion studies to establish structure - function relationships. However, such convergent evidence is, in practice, rarely provided. A previous lesion study found a striking double dissociation between two superficially similar social judgment processes, emotion recognition and personality attribution, based on the same body movement stimuli (point-light walkers). Damage to left frontal opercular (LFO) cortices was associated with impairments in personality trait attribution, whereas damage to right postcentral/ supramarginal cortices was associated with impairments in emotional state attribution. Here, we present convergent evidence from fMRI in support of this double dissociation, with regions of interest (ROIs) defined by the regions of maximal lesion overlap from the previous study.</p>
<p>Subjects learned four emotion words and four trait words, then watched a series of short point-light walker body movement stimuli. After each stimulus, subjects saw either an emotion word or a trait word and rated how well the word described the stimulus. The LFO ROI exhibited greater activity during personality judgments than during emotion judgments. In contrast, the right postcentral/supramarginal ROI exhibited greater activity during emotion judgments than during personality judgments. Follow-up experiments ruled out the possibility that the LFO activation difference was due to word frequency differences. Additionally, we found greater activity in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex previously associated with ‘‘theory of mind’’ tasks when subjects made personality, as compared to emotion judgments. D 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p>},
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<p>Cognitive neuroscientists widely agree on the importance of providing convergent evidence from neuroimaging and lesion studies to establish structure – function relationships. However, such convergent evidence is, in practice, rarely provided. A previous lesion study found a striking double dissociation between two superficially similar social judgment processes, emotion recognition and personality attribution, based on the same body movement stimuli (point-light walkers). Damage to left frontal opercular (LFO) cortices was associated with impairments in personality trait attribution, whereas damage to right postcentral/ supramarginal cortices was associated with impairments in emotional state attribution. Here, we present convergent evidence from fMRI in support of this double dissociation, with regions of interest (ROIs) defined by the regions of maximal lesion overlap from the previous study.</p>
<p>Subjects learned four emotion words and four trait words, then watched a series of short point-light walker body movement stimuli. After each stimulus, subjects saw either an emotion word or a trait word and rated how well the word described the stimulus. The LFO ROI exhibited greater activity during personality judgments than during emotion judgments. In contrast, the right postcentral/supramarginal ROI exhibited greater activity during emotion judgments than during personality judgments. Follow-up experiments ruled out the possibility that the LFO activation difference was due to word frequency differences. Additionally, we found greater activity in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex previously associated with ‘‘theory of mind’’ tasks when subjects made personality, as compared to emotion judgments. D 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p>
<p>Subjects learned four emotion words and four trait words, then watched a series of short point-light walker body movement stimuli. After each stimulus, subjects saw either an emotion word or a trait word and rated how well the word described the stimulus. The LFO ROI exhibited greater activity during personality judgments than during emotion judgments. In contrast, the right postcentral/supramarginal ROI exhibited greater activity during emotion judgments than during personality judgments. Follow-up experiments ruled out the possibility that the LFO activation difference was due to word frequency differences. Additionally, we found greater activity in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex previously associated with ‘‘theory of mind’’ tasks when subjects made personality, as compared to emotion judgments. D 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.</p>
Saxe, R; Tenenbaum, J B; Carey, S
Secret Agents: Inferences About Hidden Causes by 10- and 12-Month-Old Infants Journal Article
In: Psychological Science, vol. 16, pp. 995 - 1001, 2005, ISSN: 0956-7976.
@article{183,
title = {Secret Agents: Inferences About Hidden Causes by 10- and 12-Month-Old Infants},
author = {R Saxe and J B Tenenbaum and S Carey},
url = {http://pss.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01649.x
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/secret-agent-05.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01649.x},
issn = {0956-7976},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-12-01},
urldate = {2005-12-01},
journal = {Psychological Science},
volume = {16},
pages = {995 - 1001},
abstract = {<p>Considerable evidence indicates that preverbal infants expect that only physical contact can cause an inanimate object to move. However, very few studies have investigated infants&$#$39; expectations about the source of causal power. In three experiments, we found that (a) 10- and 12-month-old infants expect a human hand, and not an inanimate object, to be the primary cause of an inanimate object&$#$39;s motion; (b) infants&$#$39; expectations can lead them to infer a hidden causal agent without any direct perceptual evidence; and (c) infants do not infer a hidden causal agent if the moving object was previously shown to be capable of self-generated motion.</p>},
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<p>Considerable evidence indicates that preverbal infants expect that only physical contact can cause an inanimate object to move. However, very few studies have investigated infants&$#$39; expectations about the source of causal power. In three experiments, we found that (a) 10- and 12-month-old infants expect a human hand, and not an inanimate object, to be the primary cause of an inanimate object&$#$39;s motion; (b) infants&$#$39; expectations can lead them to infer a hidden causal agent without any direct perceptual evidence; and (c) infants do not infer a hidden causal agent if the moving object was previously shown to be capable of self-generated motion.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca
Against simulation: the argument from error Journal Article
In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 9, pp. 174 - 179, 2005, ISSN: 13646613.
@article{181,
title = {Against simulation: the argument from error},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661305000318
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-2005.-Against-Simulation-the-Argument-from-Error-Trends-in-Cognitive-Science.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.012},
issn = {13646613},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-04-01},
urldate = {2005-04-01},
journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
volume = {9},
pages = {174 - 179},
abstract = {<p>According to Simulation Theory, to understand what is going on in another person’s mind, the observer uses his or her own mind as a model of the other mind. Recently, philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists have proposed that mirror neurones (which fire in response to both executing and observing a goal directed action) provide a plausible neural substrate for simulation, a mechanism for directly perceiving, or ‘resonating’ with, the contents of other minds. This article makes the case against Simulation Theory, using evidence from cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and social psychology. In particular, the errors that adults and children make when reasoning about other minds are not consistent with the ‘resonance’ versions of Simulation Theory.</p>},
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<p>According to Simulation Theory, to understand what is going on in another person’s mind, the observer uses his or her own mind as a model of the other mind. Recently, philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists have proposed that mirror neurones (which fire in response to both executing and observing a goal directed action) provide a plausible neural substrate for simulation, a mechanism for directly perceiving, or ‘resonating’ with, the contents of other minds. This article makes the case against Simulation Theory, using evidence from cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and social psychology. In particular, the errors that adults and children make when reasoning about other minds are not consistent with the ‘resonance’ versions of Simulation Theory.</p>
Saxe, R; Wexler, A
Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction Journal Article
In: Neuropsychologia, vol. 43, pp. 1391 - 1399, 2005, ISSN: 00283932.
@article{182,
title = {Making sense of another mind: The role of the right temporo-parietal junction},
author = {R Saxe and A Wexler},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393205001223
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1-s2.0-S0028393205001223-main.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.02.013},
issn = {00283932},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-01-01},
urldate = {2005-01-01},
journal = {Neuropsychologia},
volume = {43},
pages = {1391 - 1399},
abstract = {<p>Human adults conceive of one another as beings with minds, and attribute to one another mental states like perceptions, desires and beliefs. That is, we understand other people using a ‘Theory of Mind’. The current study investigated the contributions of four brain regions to Theory of Mind reasoning. The right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) was recruited selectively for the attribution of mental states, and not for other socially relevant facts about a person, and the response of the RTPJ was modulated by the congruence or incongruence of multiple relevant facts about the target’s mind. None of the other three brain regions commonly implicated in Theory of Mind reasoning - the left temporo-parietal junction (LTPJ), posterior cingulate (PC) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) - showed an equally selective profile of response. The implications of these results for an alternative theory of reasoning about other minds - Simulation Theory - are discussed. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.</p>},
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pubstate = {published},
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<p>Human adults conceive of one another as beings with minds, and attribute to one another mental states like perceptions, desires and beliefs. That is, we understand other people using a ‘Theory of Mind’. The current study investigated the contributions of four brain regions to Theory of Mind reasoning. The right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) was recruited selectively for the attribution of mental states, and not for other socially relevant facts about a person, and the response of the RTPJ was modulated by the congruence or incongruence of multiple relevant facts about the target’s mind. None of the other three brain regions commonly implicated in Theory of Mind reasoning – the left temporo-parietal junction (LTPJ), posterior cingulate (PC) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) – showed an equally selective profile of response. The implications of these results for an alternative theory of reasoning about other minds – Simulation Theory – are discussed. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.</p>
Saxe, R; Carey, S; Kanwisher, N
Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging Journal Article
In: Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 55, pp. 87 - 124, 2004, ISSN: 0066-4308.
@article{33,
title = {Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging},
author = {R Saxe and S Carey and N Kanwisher},
url = {http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Carey-S.-Kanwisher-N.-2004.-Understanding-other-minds-linking-developmental-psychology-and-functional-neuroimaging-Annual-Review-of-Psychology.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044},
issn = {0066-4308},
year = {2004},
date = {2004-02-01},
urldate = {2004-02-01},
journal = {Annual Review of Psychology},
volume = {55},
pages = {87 - 124},
abstract = {<p>Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that understanding other minds constitutes a special domain of cognition with at least two components: an early-developing system for reasoning about goals, perceptions, and emotions, and a later-developing system for representing the contents of beliefs. Neuroimaging reinforces and elaborates upon this view by providing evidence that (a) domain-specific brain regions exist for representing belief contents, (b) these regions are apparently distinct from other regions engaged in reasoning about goals and actions (suggesting that the two developmental stages reflect the emergence of two distinct systems, rather than the elaboration of a single system), and (c) these regions are distinct from brain regions engaged in inhibitory control and in syntactic processing. The clear neural distinction between these processes is evidence that belief attribution is not dependent on either inhibitory control or syntax, but is subserved by a specialized neural system for theory of mind.</p>},
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<p>Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that understanding other minds constitutes a special domain of cognition with at least two components: an early-developing system for reasoning about goals, perceptions, and emotions, and a later-developing system for representing the contents of beliefs. Neuroimaging reinforces and elaborates upon this view by providing evidence that (a) domain-specific brain regions exist for representing belief contents, (b) these regions are apparently distinct from other regions engaged in reasoning about goals and actions (suggesting that the two developmental stages reflect the emergence of two distinct systems, rather than the elaboration of a single system), and (c) these regions are distinct from brain regions engaged in inhibitory control and in syntactic processing. The clear neural distinction between these processes is evidence that belief attribution is not dependent on either inhibitory control or syntax, but is subserved by a specialized neural system for theory of mind.</p>
Saxe, R; Xiao, D K; Kovacs, G; Perrett, D I; Kanwisher, N
A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions Journal Article
In: Neuropsychologia, vol. 42, pp. 1435 - 1446, 2004, ISSN: 00283932.
@article{184,
title = {A region of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions},
author = {R Saxe and D K Xiao and G Kovacs and D I Perrett and N Kanwisher},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393204000843
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Xiao-D.K.-Kovacs-G.-Perrett-D.I.-Kanwisher-N.-2004.-A-region-of-right-posterior-superior-temporal-sulcus-responds-to-observed-intentional-actions-Neuropsychologia.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.04.015},
issn = {00283932},
year = {2004},
date = {2004-01-01},
urldate = {2004-01-01},
journal = {Neuropsychologia},
volume = {42},
pages = {1435 - 1446},
abstract = {<p>Human adults and infants identify the actions of another agent based not only on its intrinsic perceptual features, but critically on the contingent relationship between its motion path and the environmental context [Trends Cogn. Sci. 7 (1995) 287; Cognition 72 (2003) 237]. Functional neuroimaging studies of the perception of agents and intentional actions, on the other hand, have mostly focussed on the perception of intrinsic cues to agency, like a face or articulated body motion (e.g. [J. Neurosci. 17 (1997) 4302; Neuroimage 8 (1998) 221; Trends Cogn. Sci. 4 (2000) 267; Nat. Neurosci. 3 (2000) 80; Neuroimage 13 (2001) 775; Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98 (2001) 11656; Neuron 35 (2002) 1167; Neuron 34 (2002) 149, Neuroscience 15 (2003) 991; J. Neurosci. 23 (2003) 6819; Philos. Trans. R Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 358 (2003) 435]. Here we describe a region of the right posterior superior temporal sulcus that is sensitive not to articulated body motion per se, but to the relationship between the observed motion and the structure of the surrounding environment. From this and other aspects of the region’s response, we hypothesize that this region is involved in the representation of observed intentional actions. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.</p>},
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<p>Human adults and infants identify the actions of another agent based not only on its intrinsic perceptual features, but critically on the contingent relationship between its motion path and the environmental context [Trends Cogn. Sci. 7 (1995) 287; Cognition 72 (2003) 237]. Functional neuroimaging studies of the perception of agents and intentional actions, on the other hand, have mostly focussed on the perception of intrinsic cues to agency, like a face or articulated body motion (e.g. [J. Neurosci. 17 (1997) 4302; Neuroimage 8 (1998) 221; Trends Cogn. Sci. 4 (2000) 267; Nat. Neurosci. 3 (2000) 80; Neuroimage 13 (2001) 775; Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98 (2001) 11656; Neuron 35 (2002) 1167; Neuron 34 (2002) 149, Neuroscience 15 (2003) 991; J. Neurosci. 23 (2003) 6819; Philos. Trans. R Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 358 (2003) 435]. Here we describe a region of the right posterior superior temporal sulcus that is sensitive not to articulated body motion per se, but to the relationship between the observed motion and the structure of the surrounding environment. From this and other aspects of the region’s response, we hypothesize that this region is involved in the representation of observed intentional actions. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.</p>
Saxe, R; Kanwisher, N
People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind” Journal Article
In: NeuroImage, vol. 19, pp. 1835 - 1842, 2003, ISSN: 10538119.
@article{34,
title = {People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”},
author = {R Saxe and N Kanwisher},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811903002301
https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe-R.-Kanwisher-N.-2003.-People-thinking-about-thinking-people-fMRI-studies-of-Theory-of-Mind-Neuroimage.pdf, PDF},
doi = {10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1},
issn = {10538119},
year = {2003},
date = {2003-08-01},
urldate = {2003-08-01},
journal = {NeuroImage},
volume = {19},
pages = {1835 - 1842},
abstract = {<p>Humans powerfully and flexibly interpret the behaviour of other people based on an understanding of their minds: that is, we use a “theory of mind.” In this study we distinguish theory of mind, which represents another person’s mental states, from a representation of the simple presence of another person per se. The studies reported here establish for the first time that a region in the human temporo-parietal junction (here called the TPJ-M) is involved specifically in reasoning about the contents of another person’s mind. First, the TPJ-M was doubly dissociated from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing et al., 2001). Second, the TPJ-M does not respond to false representations in non-social control stories. Third, the BOLD response in the TPJ-M bilaterally was higher when subjects read stories about a character’s mental states, compared with stories that described people in physical detail, which did not differ from stories about nonhuman objects. Thus, the role of the TPJ-M in understanding other people appears to be specific to reasoning about the content of mental states. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.</p>},
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pubstate = {published},
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<p>Humans powerfully and flexibly interpret the behaviour of other people based on an understanding of their minds: that is, we use a “theory of mind.” In this study we distinguish theory of mind, which represents another person’s mental states, from a representation of the simple presence of another person per se. The studies reported here establish for the first time that a region in the human temporo-parietal junction (here called the TPJ-M) is involved specifically in reasoning about the contents of another person’s mind. First, the TPJ-M was doubly dissociated from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing et al., 2001). Second, the TPJ-M does not respond to false representations in non-social control stories. Third, the BOLD response in the TPJ-M bilaterally was higher when subjects read stories about a character’s mental states, compared with stories that described people in physical detail, which did not differ from stories about nonhuman objects. Thus, the role of the TPJ-M in understanding other people appears to be specific to reasoning about the content of mental states. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.</p>
Saxe, Rebecca
Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power Journal Article
In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 0000.
@article{333,
title = {Perceiving and pursuing legitimate power},
author = {Rebecca Saxe},
url = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Saxe2022.pdf, PDF
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Ho, Mark K.; Saxe, Rebecca; Cushman, Fiery
Planning with Theory of Mind Journal Article
In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 0000.
@article{331,
title = {Planning with Theory of Mind},
author = {Mark K. Ho and Rebecca Saxe and Fiery Cushman},
url = {http://scholar.google.com/scholar?btnG=Search%2BScholar&as_q=%22Planning%2Bwith%2BTheory%2Bof%2BMind%22&as_sauthors=Ho&as_occt=any&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_sdtAAP=1&as_sdtp=1, Google Scholar
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