Publications

@article{58,

title = {Cortical responses to dynamic emotional facial expressions generalize across stimuli, and are sensitive to task-relevance, in adults with and without Autism},

author = {Dorit Kliemann and Hilary Richardson and Stefano Anzellotti and Dima Ayyash and Amanda J. Haskins and John D. E. Gabrieli and Rebecca R. Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010945218300443

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Kliemann_Richardson_Anzellotti_Ayyash_Haskins_Gabrieli_Saxe_2018.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.cortex.2018.02.006},

issn = {00109452},

year  = {2018},

date = {2018-02-01},

urldate = {2018-02-01},

journal = {Cortex},

volume = {103},

pages = {24 - 43},

abstract = {<p>Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) report difficulties extracting meaningful information from dynamic and complex social cues, like facial expressions. The nature and mechanisms of these difficulties remain unclear. Here we tested whether that difficulty can be traced to the pattern of activity in “social brain” regions, when viewing dynamic facial expressions. In two studies, adult participants (male and female) watched brief videos of a range of positive and negative facial expressions, while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (Study 1: ASD n ¼ 16, control n ¼ 21; Study 2: ASD n ¼ 22, control n ¼ 30). Patterns of hemodynamic activity differentiated among facial emotional expressions in left and right superior temporal sulcus, fusiform gyrus, and parts of medial prefrontal cortex. In both control participants and high-functioning individuals with ASD, we observed (i) similar responses to emotional valence that generalized across facial expressions and animated social events; (ii) similar flexibility of responses to emotional valence, when manipulating the task-relevance of perceived emotions; and (iii) similar responses to a range of emotions within valence. Altogether, the data indicate that there was little or no group difference in cortical responses to isolated dynamic emotional facial expressions, as measured with fMRI. Difficulties with real-world social communication and social interaction in ASD may instead reflect differences in initiating and maintaining contingent interactions, or in integrating social information over time or context.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{70,

title = {Multivariate pattern dependence},

author = {Stefano Anzellotti and Alfonso Caramazza and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005799

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/journal.pcbi_.1005799.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.100579910.1371},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-11-01},

urldate = {2017-11-01},

journal = {PLOS Computational Biology},

volume = {13},

pages = {e1005799},

abstract = {<p>When we perform a cognitive task, multiple brain regions are engaged. Understanding how these regions interact is a fundamental step to uncover the neural bases of behavior. Most research on the interactions between brain regions has focused on the univariate responses in the regions. However, fine grained patterns of response encode important information, as shown by multivariate pattern analysis. In the present article, we introduce and apply multivariate pattern dependence (MVPD): a technique to study the statistical dependence between brain regions in humans in terms of the multivariate relations between their patterns of responses. MVPD characterizes the responses in each brain region as trajectories in region-specific multidimensional spaces, and models the multivariate relationship between these trajectories. We applied MVPD to the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and to the fusiform face area (FFA), using a searchlight approach to reveal interactions between these seed regions and the rest of the brain. Across two different experiments, MVPD identified significant statistical dependence not detected by standard functional connectivity. Additionally, MVPD outperformed univariate connectivity in its ability to explain independent variance in the responses of individual voxels. In the end, MVPD uncovered different connectivity profiles associated with different representational subspaces of FFA: the first principal component of FFA shows differential connectivity with occipital and parietal regions implicated in the processing of low-level properties of faces, while the second and third components show differential connectivity with anterior temporal regions implicated in the processing of invariant representations of face identity.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{10,

title = {Parochial Empathy Predicts Reduced Altruism and the Endorsement of Passive Harm},

author = {Emile G. Bruneau and Mina Cikara and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1948550617693064

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BruneauCikaraSaxe_2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1177/1948550617693064},

issn = {1948-5506},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-11-01},

urldate = {2017-11-01},

journal = {Social Psychological and Personality Science},

pages = {934 - 942},

abstract = {<p>Empathic failures are common in hostile intergroup contexts; repairing empathy is therefore a major focus of peacebuilding efforts. However, it is unclear which aspect of empathy is most relevant to intergroup conflict. Although trait empathic concern predicts prosociality in interpersonal settings, we hypothesized that the best predictor of meaningful intergroup attitudes and behaviors might not be the general capacity for empathy (i.e., trait empathy), but the difference in empathy felt for the in-group versus the out-group, or “parochial empathy.” Specifically, we predicted that out-group empathy would inhibit intergroup harm and promote intergroup helping, whereas in-group empathy would have the opposite effect. In three intergroup contexts— Americans regarding Arabs, Hungarians regarding refugees, Greeks regarding Germans—we found support for this hypothesis. In all samples, in-group and out-group empathy had independent, significant, and opposite effects on intergroup outcomes, controlling for trait empathic concern.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{66,

title = {Formalizing emotion concepts within a Bayesian model of theory of mind},

author = {Rebecca Saxe and Sean Dae Houlihan},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2352250X17300283

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe.Houlihan.EmotionConcepts.2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.019},

issn = {2352250X},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-10-01},

urldate = {2017-10-01},

journal = {Current Opinion in Psychology},

volume = {17},

pages = {15 - 21},

abstract = {<p>Sensitivity to others’ emotions is foundational for many aspects of human life, yet computational models do not currently approach the sensitivity and specificity of human emotion knowledge. Perception of isolated physical expressions largely supplies ambiguous, low-dimensional, and noisy information about others’ emotional states. By contrast, observers attribute specific granular emotions to another person based on inferences of how she interprets (or ‘appraises’) external events in relation to her other mental states (goals, beliefs, moral values, costs). These attributions share neural mechanisms with other reasoning about minds. Situating emotion concepts in a formal model of people’s intuitive theories about other minds is necessary to effectively capture humans’ fine-grained emotion understanding.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{62,

title = {Mentalizing regions represent distributed, continuous, and abstract dimensions of others’ beliefs},

author = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Hilary Richardson and Natalia Velez and Mika Asaba and Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811917306730

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Koster-HaleRichardson_2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.08.026},

issn = {10538119},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-08-01},

urldate = {2017-08-01},

journal = {NeuroImage},

volume = {161},

pages = {9 - 18},

abstract = {<p>The human capacity to reason about others&$#$39; minds includes making causal inferences about intentions, beliefs, values, and goals. Previous fMRI research has suggested that a network of brain regions, including bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and medial prefrontal-cortex (MPFC), are reliably recruited for mental state reasoning. Here, in two fMRI experiments, we investigate the representational content of these regions. Building on existing computational and neural evidence, we hypothesized that social brain regions contain at least two functionally and spatially distinct components: one that represents information related to others&$#$39; motivations and values, and another that represents information about others&$#$39; beliefs and knowledge. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis, we find evidence that motivational versus epistemic features are independently represented by theory of mind (ToM) regions: RTPJ contains information about the justification of the belief, bilateral TPJ represents the modality of the source of knowledge, and VMPFC represents the valence of the resulting emotion. These representations are found only in regions implicated in social cognition and predict behavioral responses at the level of single items. We argue that cortical regions implicated in mental state inference contain complementary, but distinct, representations of epistemic and motivational features of others&$#$39; beliefs, and that, mirroring the processes observed in sensory systems, social stimuli are represented in distinct and distributed formats across the human brain.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{12,

title = {Using individual functional channels of interest to study cortical development with fNIRS},

author = {Lindsey J. Powell and Ben Deen and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/desc.12595

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PowellDeenSaxe_2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1111/desc.12595},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-07-01},

urldate = {2017-07-01},

journal = {Developmental Science},

pages = {e12595},

abstract = {<p>Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a noninvasive neuroimaging technique that could be uniquely effective for investigating cortical function in human infants. However, prior efforts have been hampered by the difficulty of aligning arrays of fNIRS optodes placed on the scalp to anatomical or functional regions of underlying cortex. This challenge can be addressed by identifying channels of interest in individual participants, and then testing the reliability of those channels’ response profiles in independent data. Using this approach, cortical regions with preferential responses to faces versus scenes, and to scenes versus faces, were observed reliably in both adults and infants. By contrast, standard analysis techniques did not reliably identify significant responses to both categories in either age group. These results reveal sceneresponsive regions, and confirm face-responsive regions, in preverbal infants. More generally, the analysis approach will be a robust and sensitive tool for future characterization of the early functional development of the human brain.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{64,

title = {Anterior temporal lobe and the representation of knowledge about people},

author = {Stefano Anzellotti},

url = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1703438114

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Anzellotti_2017_PNAS.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1073/pnas.1703438114},

issn = {0027-8424},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-04-01},

urldate = {2017-04-01},

journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},

volume = {114},

pages = {4042 - 4044},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{63,

title = {High-resolution magnetic resonance imaging reveals nuclei of the human amygdala: manual segmentation to automatic atlas},

author = {ZM Saygin and D Kliemann and JE Iglesias and AJW Kouwe and E Boyd and M Reuter and A Stevens and K Van Leemput and A McKee and MP Frosch and B Fischl and JC Augustinack},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811917303427

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SayginKliemannetal2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.04.046},

issn = {10538119},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-04-01},

urldate = {2017-04-01},

journal = {NeuroImage},

volume = {155},

pages = {370 - 382},

abstract = {<p>The amygdala is composed of multiple nuclei with unique functions and connections in the limbic system and to the rest of the brain. However, standard in vivo neuroimaging tools to automatically delineate the amygdala into its multiple nuclei are still rare. By scanning postmortem specimens at high resolution (100-150 µm) at 7 T field strength (n = 10), we were able to visualize and label nine amygdala nuclei (anterior amygdaloid, corticoamygdaloid transition area; basal, lateral, accessory basal, central, cortical medial, paralaminar nuclei). We created an atlas from these labels using a recently developed atlas building algorithm based on Bayesian inference. This atlas, which will be released as part of FreeSurfer, can be used to automatically segment nine amygdala nuclei from a standard resolution structural MR image. We applied this atlas to two publicly available datasets (ADNI and ABIDE) with standard resolution T1 data, used individual volumetric data of the amygdala nuclei as the measure and found that our atlas i) discriminates between Alzheimer&$#$39;s disease participants and age-matched control participants with 84% accuracy (AUC=0.915), and ii) discriminates between individuals with autism and age-, sex- and IQ-matched neurotypically developed control participants with 59.5% accuracy (AUC=0.59). For both datasets, the new ex vivo atlas significantly outperformed (all p < .05) estimations of the whole amygdala derived from the segmentation in FreeSurfer 5.1 (ADNI: 75%, ABIDE: 54% accuracy), as well as classification based on whole amygdala volume (using the sum of all amygdala nuclei volumes; ADNI: 81%, ABIDE: 55% accuracy). This new atlas and the segmentation tools that utilize it will provide neuroimaging researchers with the ability to explore the function and connectivity of the human amygdala nuclei with unprecedented detail in healthy adults as well as those with neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative disorders.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{60,

title = {Replications of implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands},

author = {Lindsey J. Powell and Kathryn Hobbs and Alexandros Bardis and Susan Carey and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0885201417300461

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Powell_Hobbs_Bardis_Carey_Saxe_2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.004},

issn = {08852014},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-04-01},

urldate = {2017-04-01},

journal = {Cognitive Development},

volume = {46},

pages = {40 - 50},

abstract = {<p>We attempted to reproduce three tests of theory of mind in infants using implicit tasks that have been previously reported in the literature. These efforts were intended as initial steps in larger projects aimed at building on past research to better understand infants’ theory of mind capacities and their relationship to preschoolers’ explicit theory of mind. One task fully replicated evidence of 2-year-old children’s sensitivity to others’ ignorance. The results of another task testing for similar capacities in 18-month-old infants also elicited behavior similar to the original findings, although in that case we only conducted one of two conditions critical for demonstrating that performance depended upon theory of mind capacities. In contrast, our violation of expectation tasks failed to reproduce evidence that, by 18 months of age, infants form specific expectations about the actions an agent will engage in on the basis of false beliefs. Instead, looking times were consistent with infants having no clear prediction about the agent&$#$39;s actions under conditions of false belief. We discuss factors that might account for our failure to reproduce the previously reported violation of expectation results on which we were attempting to build. However, we also discuss the consistency of our data with other findings and hypotheses regarding early-developing theory of mind, and consider the possibility that they reflect the veridical abilities of 18-month-old infants, who may track others’ knowledge and ignorance but may not consistently represent the contents of others’ beliefs.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{65,

title = {Learning a commonsense moral theory},

author = {Max Kleiman-Weiner and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua B. Tenenbaum},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027717300707

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Kleiman-Weiner.etal_.2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005},

issn = {00100277},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-03-01},

urldate = {2017-03-01},

journal = {Cognition},

volume = {167},

pages = {107 - 123},

abstract = {<p>We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one’s own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{67,

title = {Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing},

author = {Chris L. Baker and Julian Jara-Ettinger and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua B. Tenenbaum},

url = {http://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0064

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Baker.etal_.2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1038/s41562-017-0064},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-03-01},

urldate = {2017-03-01},

journal = {Nature Human Behaviour},

abstract = {<p>Social cognition depends on our capacity for ‘mentalizing’, or explaining an agent’s behaviour in terms of their mental states. The development and neural substrates of mentalizing are well-studied, but its computational basis is only beginning to be probed. Here we present a model of core mentalizing computations: inferring jointly an actor’s beliefs, desires and percepts from how they move in the local spatial environment. Our Bayesian theory of mind (BToM) model is based on probabilistically inverting artificial-intelligence approaches to rational planning and state estimation, which extend classical expected-utility agent models to sequential actions in complex, partially observable domains. The model accurately captures the quantitative mental-state judgements of human participants in two experiments, each varying multiple stimulus dimensions across a large number of stimuli. Comparative model fits with both simpler ‘lesioned’ BToM models and a family of simpler non-mentalistic motion features reveal the value contributed by each component of our model.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{68,

title = {Directed network discovery with dynamic network modelling},

author = {Stefano Anzellotti and Dorit Kliemann and Nir Jacoby and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393217300520

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/AnzellottiKliemannJacobySaxe2016.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.02.006},

issn = {00283932},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-02-01},

urldate = {2017-02-01},

journal = {Neuropsychologia},

volume = {99},

pages = {1 - 11},

abstract = {<p>Cognitive tasks recruit multiple brain regions. Understanding how these regions influence each other (the network structure) is an important step to characterize the neural basis of cognitive processes. Often, limited evidence is available to restrict the range of hypotheses a priori, and techniques that sift efficiently through a large number of possible network structures are needed (network discovery). This article introduces a novel modelling technique for network discovery (Dynamic Network Modelling or DNM) that builds on ideas from Granger Causality and Dynamic Causal Modelling introducing three key changes: (1) efficient network discovery is implemented with statistical tests on the consistency of model parameters across participants, (2) the tests take into account the magnitude and sign of each influence, and (3) variance explained in independent data is used as an absolute (rather than relative) measure of the quality of the network model. In this article, we outline the functioning of DNM, we validate DNM in simulated data for which the ground truth is known, and we report an example of its application to the investigation of influences between regions during emotion recognition, revealing top-down influences from brain regions encoding abstract representations of emotions (medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus) onto regions engaged in the perceptual analysis of facial expressions (occipital face area and fusiform face area) when participants are asked to switch between reporting the emotional valence and the age of a face.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{13,

title = {Organization of high-level visual cortex in human infants},

author = {Ben Deen and Hilary Richardson and Daniel D. Dilks and Atsushi Takahashi and Boris Keil and Lawrence L. Wald and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/ncomms13995

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/deen.etal_.2017.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1038/ncomms13995},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-01-01},

urldate = {2017-01-01},

journal = {Nature Communications},

volume = {8},

pages = {13995},

abstract = {<p>How much of the structure of the human mind and brain is already specified at birth, and how much arises from experience? In this article, we consider the test case of extrastriate visual cortex, where a highly systematic functional organization is present in virtually every normal adult, including regions preferring behaviourally significant stimulus categories, such as faces, bodies, and scenes. Novel methods were developed to scan awake infants with fMRI, while they viewed multiple categories of visual stimuli. Here we report that the visual cortex of 4-6-month-old infants contains regions that respond preferentially to abstract categories (faces and scenes), with a spatial organization similar to adults. However, precise response profiles and patterns of activity across multiple visual categories differ between infants and adults. These results demonstrate that the large-scale organization of category preferences in visual cortex is adult-like within a few months after birth, but is subsequently refined through development.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{14,

title = {Decoding task and stimulus representations in face-responsive cortex},

author = {Dorit Kliemann and Nir Jacoby and Stefano Anzellotti and Rebecca R. Saxe},

url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02643294.2016.1256873

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/KliemannJacobyAnzellottiSaxe2016.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1080/02643294.2016.1256873},

issn = {0264-3294},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-11-01},

urldate = {2016-11-01},

journal = {Cognitive Neuropsychology},

volume = {33},

pages = {362 - 377},

abstract = {<p>Observers can deliberately attend to some aspects of a face (e.g. emotional expression) while ignoring others. How do internal goals influence representational geometry in face-responsive cortex? Participants watched videos of naturalistic dynamic faces during MRI scanning. We measured multivariate neural response patterns while participants formed an intention to attend to a facial aspect (age, or emotional valence), and then attended to that aspect, and responses to the face&$#$39;s emotional valence, independent of attention. Distinct patterns of response to the two tasks were found while forming the intention, in left fronto-lateral but not face-responsive regions, and while attending to the face, in almost all face-responsive regions. Emotional valence was represented in right posterior superior temporal sulcus and medial prefrontal cortex, but could not be decoded when unattended. Shifting the focus of attention thus alters cortical representation of social information, probably reflecting neural flexibility to optimally integrate goals and perceptual input.</p>},

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pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{15,

title = {Measuring and Modeling Transformations of Information Between Brain Regions with fMRI},

author = {Stefano Anzellotti and Evelina Fedorenko and Alfonso Caramazza and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/AnzellottiFedorenkoCaramazzaSaxe2016.pdf, PDF},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-10-01},

urldate = {2016-10-01},

journal = {bioRxiv},

abstract = {<p>Investigating how information is transformed from brain region to brain region is a crucial step to understand the neural foundations of cognitive processes. This investigation requires a characterization of the representations encoded in different regions, and models of how they are transformed that can match the complexity of neural processes. We introduce an approach in which representations are characterized as points in multidimensional spaces, and processes transforming representations from region to region are modeled as nonlinear functions using artificial neural networks. Across multiple experiments with different stimuli and tasks, we show that this approach reveals functionally relevant network structure and outperforms comparable linear models at predicting independent data.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{69,

title = {Moral status of accidents},

author = {Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1604154113

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe2016.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1073/pnas.1604154113},

issn = {0027-8424},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-04-01},

urldate = {2016-04-01},

journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},

volume = {113},

pages = {4555 - 4557},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{17,

title = {When minds matter for moral judgment: intent information is neurally encoded for harmful but not impure acts},

author = {Alek Chakroff and James Dungan and Jorie Koster-Hale and Amelia Brown and Rebecca Saxe and Liane Young},

url = {https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/scan/nsv131

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Saxe2016.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1093/scan/nsv131},

issn = {1749-5016},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-03-01},

urldate = {2016-03-01},

journal = {Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience},

volume = {1120},

pages = {476 - 484},

abstract = {<p>Recent behavioral evidence indicates a key role for intent in moral judgments of harmful acts (e.g. assault) but not impure acts (e.g. incest). We tested whether the neural responses in regions for mental state reasoning, including the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), are greater when people evaluate harmful vs impure violations. In addition, using multivoxel pattern analysis, we investigated whether the voxel-wise pattern in these regions distinguishes intentional from accidental actions, for either kind of violation. The RTPJ was preferentially recruited in response to harmful vs impure acts. Moreover, although its response was equally high for intentional and accidental acts, the voxel-wise pattern in the RTPJ distinguished intentional from accidental acts in the harm domain but not the purity domain. Finally, we found that the degree to which the RTPJ discriminated between intentional and accidental acts predicted the impact of intent information on moral judgments but again only in the harm domain. These findings reveal intent to be a uniquely critical factor for moral evaluations of harmful vs impure acts and shed light on the neural computations for mental state reasoning.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{72,

title = {Functional Organization of Social Perception and Cognition in the Superior Temporal Sulcus},

author = {Ben Deen and Kami Koldewyn and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhv111

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DeenKoldewynKanwisherSaxe2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1093/cercor/bhv111},

issn = {1047-3211},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-11-01},

urldate = {2015-11-01},

journal = {Cerebral Cortex},

volume = {25},

pages = {4596 - 4609},

abstract = {<p>The superior temporal sulcus (STS) is considered a hub for social perception and cognition, including the perception of faces and human motion, as well as understanding others’ actions, mental states, and language. However, the functional organization of the STS remains debated: Is this broad region composed of multiple functionally distinct modules, each specialized for a different process, or are STS subregions multifunctional, contributing to multiple processes? Is the STS spatially organized, and if so, what are the dominant features of this organization? We address these questions by measuring STS responses to a range of social and linguistic stimuli in the same set of human participants, using fMRI. We find a number of STS subregions that respond selectively to certain types of social input, organized along a posterior-to-anterior axis. We also identify regions of overlapping response to multiple contrasts, including regions responsive to both language and theory of mind, faces and voices, and faces and biological motion. Thus, the human STS contains both relatively domain-specific areas, and regions that respond to multiple types of social information.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{71,

title = {Localizing Pain Matrix and Theory of Mind networks with both verbal and non-verbal stimuli},

author = {Nir Jacoby and Emile Bruneau and Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811915010472

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/JacobyBruneauKosterHaleSaxe2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.11.025},

issn = {10538119},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-11-01},

urldate = {2015-11-01},

journal = {NeuroImage},

volume = {126},

pages = {39 - 48},

abstract = {<p>Functional localizer tasks allow researchers to identify brain regions in each individual&$#$39;s brain, using a combination of anatomical and functional constraints. In this study, we compare three social cognitive localizer tasks, designed to efficiently identify regions in the “Pain Matrix,” recruited in response to a person&$#$39;s physical pain, and the “Theory of Mind network,” recruited in response to a person&$#$39;s mental states (i.e. beliefs and emotions). Participants performed three tasks: first, the verbal false-belief stories task; second, a verbal task including stories describing physical pain versus emotional suffering; and third, passively viewing a non-verbal animated movie, which included segments depicting physical pain and beliefs and emotions. All three localizers were efficient in identifying replicable, stable networks in individual subjects. The consistency across tasks makes all three tasks viable localizers. Nevertheless, there were small reliable differences in the location of the regions and the pattern of activity within regions, hinting at more specific representations. The new localizers go beyond those currently available: first, they simultaneously identify two functional networks with no additional scan time, and second, the non-verbal task extends the populations in whom functional localizers can be applied. These localizers will be made publicly available.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{21,

title = {Neural Representations of Emotion Are Organized around Abstract Event Features},

author = {E Skerry and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982215006740https://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0960982215006740?httpAccept=text/xmlhttps://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0960982215006740?httpAccept=text/plain

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SkerrySaxe2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.cub.2015.06.009},

issn = {09609822},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-08-01},

urldate = {2015-08-01},

journal = {Current Biology},

volume = {25},

pages = {1945 - 1954},

abstract = {<p>Research on emotion attribution has tended to focus on the perception of overt expressions of at most five or six basic emotions. However, our ability to identify others’ emotional states is not limited to perception of these canonical expressions. Instead, we make fine-grained inferences about what others feel based on the situations they encounter, relying on knowledge of the eliciting conditions for different emotions. In the present research, we provide convergent behavioral and neural evidence concerning the representations underlying these concepts. First, we find that patterns of activity in mentalizing regions contain information about subtle emotional distinctions conveyed through verbal descriptions of eliciting situations. Second, we identify a space of abstract situation features that well captures the emotion discriminations subjects make behaviorally and show that this feature space outperforms competing models in capturing the similarity space of neural patterns in these regions. Together, the data suggest that our knowledge of others’ emotions is abstract and high dimensional, that brain regions selective for mental state reasoning support relatively subtle distinctions between emotion concepts, and that the neural representations in these regions are not reducible to more primitive affective dimensions such as valence and arousal.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{75,

title = {Occipital Cortex of Blind Individuals Is Functionally Coupled with Executive Control Areas of Frontal Cortex},

author = {Ben Deen and Rebecca Saxe and Marina Bedny},

url = {http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/jocn_a_00807

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DeenSaxeBedny2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_00807},

issn = {0898-929X},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-08-01},

urldate = {2015-08-01},

journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},

volume = {27},

pages = {1633 - 1647},

abstract = {<p>In congenital blindness, the occipital cortex responds to a range of nonvisual inputs, including tactile, auditory, and linguistic stimuli. Are these changes in functional responses to stimuli accompanied by altered interactions with nonvisual functional networks? To answer this question, we introduce a data-driven method that searches across cortex for functional connectivity differences across groups. Replicating prior work, we find increased fronto-occipital functional connectivity in congenitally blind relative to blindfolded sighted participants. We demonstrate that this heightened connectivity extends over most of occipital cortex but is specific to a subset of regions in the inferior, dorsal, and medial frontal lobe. To assess the functional profile of these frontal areas, we used an n-back working memory task and a sentence comprehension task. We find that, among prefrontal areas with overconnectivity to occipital cortex, one left inferior frontal region responds to language over music. By contrast, the majority of these regions responded to working memory load but not language. These results suggest that in blindness occipital cortex interacts more with working memory systems and raise new questions about the function and mechanism of occipital plasticity.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{78,

title = {A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind},

author = {Jonathan Phillips and Desmond C. Ong and Andrew D. R. Surtees and Yijing Xin and Samantha Williams and Rebecca Saxe and Michael C. Frank},

url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797614558717

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/phillips-2015-psychsci.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1177/0956797614558717},

issn = {0956-7976},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-08-01},

urldate = {2015-08-01},

journal = {Psychological Science},

volume = {26},

pages = {1353 - 1367},

abstract = {<p>In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{20,

title = {“Visual” Cortex Responds to Spoken Language in Blind Children},

author = {Marina Bedny and Hilary Richardson and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://www.jneurosci.org/lookup/doi/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0634-15.2015

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BednyRichardsonSaxe2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0634-15.2015},

issn = {0270-6474},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-08-01},

urldate = {2015-08-01},

journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience},

volume = {35},

pages = {11674 - 11681},

abstract = {<p>Plasticity inthe visual cortex of blind individuals provides a rare window intothe mechanisms of cortical specialization. Inthe absence of visual input, occipital (“visual”) brain regions respond to sound and spoken language. Here, we examined the time course and developmental mechanism of this plasticity in blind children. Nineteen blind and 40 sighted children and adolescents (4 -17 years old) listened to stories and two auditory control conditions (unfamiliar foreign speech, and music). We find that “visual” cortices of young blind (but not sighted) children respond to sound. Responses to nonlanguage sounds increased between the ages of 4 and 17. By contrast, occipital responses to spoken language were maximal by age 4 and were not related to Braille learning. These findings suggest that occipital plasticity for spoken language is independent of plasticity for Braille and for sound. We conclude that in the absence of visual input, spoken language colonizes the visual system during brain development. Our findings suggest that early in life, human cortex has a remarkably broad computational capacity. The same cortical tissue can take on visual perception and language functions.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{73,

title = {Empathic control through coordinated interaction of amygdala, theory of mind and extended pain matrix brain regions},

author = {Emile G. Bruneau and Nir Jacoby and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811915003250

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Bruneau_etal_2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.04.034},

issn = {10538119},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-07-01},

urldate = {2015-07-01},

journal = {NeuroImage},

volume = {114},

pages = {105 - 119},

abstract = {<p>Brain regions in the “pain matrix”, can be activated by observing or reading about others in physical pain. In previous research, we found that reading stories about others&$#$39; emotional suffering, by contrast, recruits a different group of brain regions mostly associated with thinking about others&$#$39; minds. In the current study, we examined the neural circuits responsible for deliberately regulating empathic responses to others&$#$39; pain and suffering. In Study 1, a sample of college-aged participants (n = 18) read stories about physically painful and emotionally distressing events during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), while either actively empathizing with the main character or trying to remain objective. In Study 2, the same experiment was performed with professional social workers, who are chronically exposed to human suffering (n = 21). Across both studies activity in the amygdala was associated with empathic regulation towards others&$#$39; emotional pain, but not their physical pain. In addition, psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis and Granger causal modeling (GCM) showed that amygdala activity while reading about others&$#$39; emotional pain was preceded by and positively coupled with activity in the theory of mind brain regions, and followed by and negatively coupled with activity in regions associated with physical pain and bodily sensations. Previous work has shown that the amygdala is critically involved in the deliberate control of self-focused distress — the current results extend the central importance of amygdala activity to the control of other-focused empathy, but only when considering others&$#$39; emotional pain.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{76,

title = {Structural Connectivity Fingerprints Predict Cortical Selectivity for Multiple Visual Categories across Cortex},

author = {David E. Osher and Rebecca R. Saxe and Kami Koldewyn and John D. E. Gabrieli and Nancy Kanwisher and Zeynep M. Saygin},

url = {https://academic.oup.com/cercor/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhu303

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Osher_etal_2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1093/cercor/bhu303},

issn = {1047-3211},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-04-01},

urldate = {2015-04-01},

journal = {Cerebral Cortex},

volume = {26},

pages = {1668 - 1683},

abstract = {<p>A fundamental and largely unanswered question in neuroscience is whether extrinsic connectivity and function are closely related at a fine spatial grain across the human brain. Using a novel approach, we found that the anatomical connectivity of individual gray-matter voxels (determined via diffusion-weighted imaging) alone can predict functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) responses to 4 visual categories (faces, objects, scenes, and bodies) in individual subjects, thus accounting for both functional differentiation across the cortex and individual variation therein. Furthermore, this approach identified the particular anatomical links between voxels that most strongly predict, and therefore plausibly define, the neural networks underlying specific functions. These results provide the strongest evidence to date for a precise and fine-grained relationship between connectivity and function in the human brain, raise the possibility that early-developing connectivity patterns may determine later functional organization, and offer a method for predicting fine-grained functional organization in populations who cannot be functionally scanned.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{74,

title = {Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning},

author = {Robert P. Spunt and Jed T. Elison and Nicholas Dufour and 'e Hurlemann and Rebecca Saxe and Ralph Adolphs},

url = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1422679112

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/spunt_etal_2015.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1073/pnas.1422679112},

issn = {0027-8424},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-02-01},

urldate = {2015-02-01},

journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},

volume = {112153},

pages = {4827 - 4832},

abstract = {<p>The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people’s mental states as distinct from one’s own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM—false-belief reasoning—suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{77,

title = {A Common Neural Code for Perceived and Inferred Emotion},

author = {A E Skerry and R Saxe},

url = {http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/doi/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1676-14.2014

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SkerryandSaxe2014.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1676-14.2014},

issn = {0270-6474},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-11-01},

urldate = {2014-11-01},

journal = {Journal of Neuroscience},

volume = {34},

pages = {15997 - 16008},

abstract = {<p>Although the emotions of other people can often be perceived from overt reactions (e.g., facial or vocal expressions), they can also be inferred from situational information in the absence of observable expressions. How does the human brain make use of these diverse forms of evidence to generate a common representation of a target’s emotional state? In the present research, we identify neural patterns that correspond to emotions inferred from contextual information and find that these patterns generalize across different cues from which an emotion can be attributed. Specifically, we use functional neuroimaging to measure neural responses to dynamic facial expressions with positive and negative valence and to short animations in which the valence of a character’s emotion could be identified only from the situation. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we test for regions that contain information about the target’s emotional state, identifying representations specific to a single stimulus type and representations that generalize across stimulus types. In regions of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a classifiertrainedto discriminate emotional valence for one stimulus (e.g., animated situations) could successfully discriminate valence for the remaining stimulus (e.g., facial expressions), indicating a representation of valence that abstracts away from perceptual features and generalizes across different forms of evidence. Moreover, in a subregion of MPFC, this neural representation generalized to trials involving subjectively experienced emotional events, suggesting partial overlap in neural responses to attributed and experienced emotions. These data provide a step toward understanding how the brain transforms stimulus-bound inputs into abstract representations of emotion.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{80,

title = {Their pain gives us pleasure: How intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses},

author = {M Cikara and E Bruneau and JJ Van Bavel and R Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002210311400095X

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cikara_etal_2014.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2014.06.007},

issn = {00221031},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-11-01},

urldate = {2014-11-01},

journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},

volume = {55},

pages = {110 - 125},

abstract = {<p>Despite its early origins and adaptive functions, empathy is not inevitable; people routinely fail to empathize with others, especially members of different social or cultural groups. In five experiments, we systematically explore how social identity, functional relations between groups, competitive threat, and perceived entitativity contribute to intergroup empathy bias: the tendency not only to empathize less with out-group relative to in-group members, but also to feel pleasure in response to their pain (and pain in response to their pleasure). When teams are set in direct competition, affective responses to competition-irrelevant events are characterized not only by less empathy toward out-group relative to in-group members, but also by increased counter-empathic responses: Schadenfreude and Glückschmerz (Experiment 1). Comparing responses to in-group and out-group targets against responses to unaffiliated targets in this competitive context suggests that intergroup empathy bias may be better characterized by out-group antipathy rather than extraordinary in-group empathy (Experiment 2). We also find that intergroup empathy bias is robust to changes in relative group standing—feedback indicating that the out-group has fallen behind (Experiment 3a) or is no longer a competitive threat (Experiment 3b) does not reduce the bias. However, reducing perceived in-group and out-group entitativity can significantly attenuate intergroup empathy bias (Experiment 4). This research establishes the boundary conditions of intergroup empathy bias and provides initial support for a more integrative framework of group-based empathy.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{79,

title = {The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents},

author = {Adrianna C. Jenkins and David Dodell-Feder and Rebecca Saxe and Joshua Knobe},

editor = {Allan Siegel},

url = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105341

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Jenkins_etal_2014.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.010534110.1371},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-08-01},

urldate = {2014-08-01},

journal = {PLoS ONE},

volume = {9},

pages = {e105341},

abstract = {<p>In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets’ mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{81,

title = {Thinking about seeing: Perceptual sources of knowledge are encoded in the theory of mind brain regions of sighted and blind adults},

author = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027714000675

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/KosterHale_2014.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2014.04.006},

issn = {00100277},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-04-01},

urldate = {2014-04-01},

journal = {Cognition},

volume = {133},

pages = {65 - 78},

abstract = {<p>Blind people’s inferences about how other people see provide a window into fundamental questions about the human capacity to think about one another’s thoughts. By working with blind individuals, we can ask both what kinds of representations people form about others’ minds, and how much these representations depend on the observer having had similar mental states themselves. Thinking about others’ mental states depends on a specific group of brain regions, including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). We investigated the representations of others’ mental states in these brain regions, using multivoxel pattern analyses (MVPA). We found that, first, in the RTPJ of sighted adults, the pattern of neural response distinguished the source of the mental state (did the protagonist see or hear something?) but not the valence (did the protagonist feel good or bad?). Second, these neural representations were preserved in congenitally blind adults. These results suggest that the temporo-parietal junction contains explicit, abstract representations of features of others’ mental states, including the perceptual source. The persistence of these representations in congenitally blind adults, who have no first-person experience with sight, provides evidence that these representations emerge even in the absence of relevant first-person perceptual experiences.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{82,

title = {Reduced self-referential neural response during intergroup competition predicts competitor harm},

author = {M Cikara and AC Jenkins and N Dufour and R Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811914002420

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Cikara_2014.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.03.080},

issn = {10538119},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-03-01},

urldate = {2014-03-01},

journal = {NeuroImage},

volume = {96},

pages = {36 - 43},

abstract = {<p>Why do interactions become more hostile when social relations shift from “me versus you” to “us versus them”? One possibility is that acting with a group can reduce spontaneous self-referential processing in the moral domain and, in turn, facilitate competitor harm. We tested this hypothesis in an fMRI experiment in which (i) participants performed a competitive task once alone and once with a group; (ii) spontaneous self-referential processing during competition was indexed unobtrusively by activation in an independently localized region of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) associated with self-reference; and (iii) we assessed participants&$#$39; willingness to harm competitors versus teammates. As predicted, participants who showed reduced mPFC activation in response to descriptions of their own moral behaviors while competing in a group were more willing to harm competitors. These results suggest that intergroup competition (above and beyond inter-personal competition) can reduce self-referential processing of moral information, enabling harmful behaviors towards members of a competitive group.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{23,

title = {Differences in the right inferior longitudinal fasciculus but no general disruption of white matter tracts in children with autism spectrum disorder},

author = {Kami Koldewyn and Anastasia Yendiki and Sarah Weigelt and Hyowon Gweon and Joshua Julian and Hilary Richardson and Caitlin Malloy and Rebecca Saxe and Bruce Fischl and Nancy Kanwisher},

url = {http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1324037111

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PNAS_2014_Koldewyn.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1073/pnas.1324037111},

issn = {0027-8424},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-02-01},

urldate = {2014-02-01},

journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},

volume = {111},

pages = {1981 - 1986},

abstract = {<p>One of the most widely cited features of the neural phenotype of autism is reduced “integrity” of long-range white matter tracts, a claim based primarily on diffusion imaging studies. However, many prior studies have small sample sizes and/or fail to address differences in data quality between those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typical participants, and there is little consensus on which tracts are affected. To overcome these problems, we scanned a large sample of children with autism (n = 52) and typically developing children (n = 73). Data quality was variable, and worse in the ASD group, with some scans unusable because of head motion artifacts. When we follow standard data analysis practices (i.e., without matching head motion between groups), we replicate the finding of lower fractional anisotropy (FA) in multiple white matter tracts. However, when we carefully match data quality between groups, all these effects disappear except in one tract, the right inferior longitudinal fasciculus (ILF). Additional analyses showed the expected developmental increases in the FA of fiber tracts within ASD and typical groups individually, demonstrating that we had sufficient statistical power to detect known group differences. Our data challenge the widely claimed general disruption of white matter tracts in autism, instead implicating only one tract, the right ILF, in the ASD phenotype.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{84,

title = {Similar Brain Activation during False Belief Tasks in a Large Sample of Adults with and without Autism},

author = {Nicholas Dufour and Elizabeth Redcay and Liane Young and Penelope L. Mavros and Joseph M. Moran and Christina Triantafyllou and John D. E. Gabrieli and Rebecca Saxe},

editor = {Sam Gilbert},

url = {http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0075468

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Dufour_2013.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.007546810.1371},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-09-01},

urldate = {2013-09-01},

journal = {PLoS ONE},

volume = {8},

pages = {e75468},

abstract = {<p>Reading about another person’s beliefs engages ‘Theory of Mind’ processes and elicits highly reliable brain activation across individuals and experimental paradigms. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined activation during a story task designed to elicit Theory of Mind processing in a very large sample of neurotypical (N = 462) individuals, and a group of high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders (N = 31), using both region-of-interest and wholebrain analyses. This large sample allowed us to investigate group differences in brain activation to Theory of Mind tasks with unusually high sensitivity. There were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. These results imply that the social cognitive impairments typical of autism spectrum disorder can occur without measurable changes in the size, location or response magnitude of activity during explicit Theory of Mind tasks administered to adults.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{85,

title = {Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem},

author = {Jorie Koster-Hale and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S089662731300754X

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Koster-Hale.Saxe_2013.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.neuron.2013.08.020},

issn = {08966273},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-09-01},

urldate = {2013-09-01},

journal = {Neuron},

volume = {79},

pages = {836 - 848},

abstract = {<p>Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information. Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework from high-level sensory processing to the more abstract domain of theory of mind; that is, to inferences about others’ goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of predictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{86,

title = {People can understand descriptions of motion without activating visual motion brain regions},

author = {Swethasri Dravida and Rebecca Saxe and Marina Bedny},

url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00537/abstract

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Dravida_2013.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00537},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-08-01},

urldate = {2013-08-01},

journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},

volume = {4},

pages = {537},

abstract = {<p>What is the relationship between our perceptual and linguistic neural representations of the same event? We approached this question by asking whether visual perception of motion and understanding linguistic depictions of motion rely on the same neural architecture. The same group of participants took part in two language tasks and one visual task. In task 1, participants made semantic similarity judgments with high motion (e.g., “to bounce”) and low motion (e.g., “to look”) words. In task 2, participants made plausibility judgments for passages describing movement (“A centaur hurled a spear ... ”) or cognitive events (“A gentleman loved cheese ...”). Task 3 was a visual motion localizer in which participants viewed animations of point-light walkers, randomly moving dots, and stationary dots changing in luminance. Based on the visual motion localizer we identified classic visual motion areas of the temporal (MT/MST and STS) and parietal cortex (inferior and superior parietal lobules). We find that these visual cortical areas are largely distinct from neural responses to linguistic depictions of motion. Motion words did not activate any part of the visual motion system. Motion passages produced a small response in the right superior parietal lobule, but none of the temporal motion regions. These results suggest that (1) as compared to words, rich language stimuli such as passages are more likely to evoke mental imagery and more likely to affect perceptual circuits and (2) effects of language on the visual system are more likely in secondary perceptual areas as compared to early sensory areas. We conclude that language and visual perception constitute distinct but interacting systems.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{90,

title = {A Noisy-Channel Account of Crosslinguistic Word-Order Variation},

author = {Edward Gibson and Steven T. Piantadosi and Kimberly Brink and Leon Bergen and Eunice Lim and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797612463705

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/10.1.1.906.4931.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1177/0956797612463705},

issn = {0956-7976},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-07-01},

urldate = {2013-07-01},

journal = {Psychological Science},

volume = {24},

pages = {1079 - 1088},

abstract = {<p>The distribution of word orders across languages is highly nonuniform, with subject-verb-object (SVO) and subjectobject-verb (SOV) orders being prevalent. Recent work suggests that the SOV order may be the default in human language. Why, then, is SVO order so common? We hypothesize that SOV/SVO variation can be explained by language users’ sensitivity to the possibility of noise corrupting the linguistic signal. In particular, the noisy-channel hypothesis predicts a shift from the default SOV order to SVO order for semantically reversible events, for which potential ambiguity arises in SOV order because two plausible agents appear on the same side of the verb. We found support for this prediction in three languages (English, Japanese, and Korean) by using a gesture-production task, which reflects word-order preferences largely independent of native language. Other patterns of crosslinguistic variation (e.g., the prevalence of case marking in SOV languages and its relative absence in SVO languages) also straightforwardly follow from the noisy-channel hypothesis.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{89,

title = {How We Know It Hurts: Item Analysis of Written Narratives Reveals Distinct Neural Responses to Others’ Physical Pain and Emotional Suffering},

author = {Emile Bruneau and Nicholas Dufour and Rebecca Saxe},

editor = {Katsumi Watanabe},

url = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0063085

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BruneauDufourSaxe_2013.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.006308510.1371},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-04-01},

urldate = {2013-04-01},

journal = {PLoS ONE},

volume = {8},

pages = {e63085},

abstract = {<p>People are often called upon to witness, and to empathize with, the pain and suffering of others. In the current study, we directly compared neural responses to others’ physical pain and emotional suffering by presenting participants (n = 41) with 96 verbal stories, each describing a protagonist’s physical and/or emotional experience, ranging from neutral to extremely negative. A separate group of participants rated ‘‘how much physical pain’’, and ‘‘how much emotional suffering’’ the protagonist experienced in each story, as well as how ‘‘vivid and movie-like’’ the story was. Although ratings of Pain, Suffering and Vividness were positively correlated with each other across stories, item-analyses revealed that each scale was correlated with activity in distinct brain regions. Even within regions of the ‘‘Shared Pain network’’ identified using a separate data set, responses to others’ physical pain and emotional suffering were distinct. More broadly, item analyses with continuous predictors provided a high-powered method for identifying brain regions associated with specific aspects of complex stimuli - like verbal descriptions of physical and emotional events.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{91,

title = {Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions},

author = {J Koster-Hale and R Saxe and J Dungan and L L Young},

url = {http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1207992110

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PNAS-2013-Koster-Hale-1207992110.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1073/pnas.1207992110},

issn = {0027-8424},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-02-01},

urldate = {2013-02-01},

journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},

pages = {5648 - 5653},

abstract = {<p>Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants’ moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e.g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{97,

title = {Teaching Replication},

author = {Michael C Frank and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1745691612460686

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FrankSaxe_2012.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1177/1745691612460686},

issn = {1745-6916},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-11-01},

urldate = {2012-11-01},

journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},

volume = {7},

pages = {600 - 604},

abstract = {<div>Replication is held as the gold standard for ensuring the reliability of published scientific literature. But conducting direct replications is expensive, time-consuming, and unrewarded under current publication practices. So who will do them? The authors argue that students in laboratory classes should replicate recent findings as part of their training in experimental methods. In their own courses, the authors have found that replicating cutting-edge results is exciting and fun; it gives students the opportunity to make real scientific contributions (provided supervision is appropriate); and it provides object lessons about the scientific process, the importance of reporting standards, and the value of openness.</div>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{140,

title = {Theory of Mind Performance in Children Correlates With Functional Specialization of a Brain Region for Thinking About Thoughts},

author = {Hyowon Gweon and David Dodell-Feder and Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/cdev.2012.83.issue-6

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/j.1467-8624.2012.01829.x.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1111/cdev.2012.83.issue-610.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01829.x},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-11-01},

urldate = {2012-11-01},

journal = {Child Development},

pages = {1853 - 1868},

abstract = {<p>Thinking about other people’s thoughts recruits a specific group of brain regions, including the temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ), precuneus (PC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). The same brain regions were recruited when children (N = 20, 5-11 years) and adults (N = 8) listened to descriptions of characters’ mental states, compared to descriptions of physical events. Between ages 5 and 11 years, responses in the bilateral TPJ became increasingly specific to stories describing mental states as opposed to people’s appearance and social relationships. Functional activity in the right TPJ was related to children’s performance on a high level theory of mind task. These findings provide insights into the origin of neural mechanisms of theory of mind, and how behavioral and neural changes can be related in development.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{138,

title = {Atypical brain activation patterns during a face-to-face joint attention game in adults with autism spectrum disorder},

author = {Elizabeth Redcay and David Dodell-Feder and Penelope L Mavros and Mario Kleiner and Mark J Pearrow and Christina Triantafyllou and John D Gabrieli and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/hbm.v34.10

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/b171dc1d6dcf3fbac78c87f5f756f429bbbc.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1002/hbm.v34.1010.1002/hbm.22086},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-10-01},

urldate = {2012-10-01},

journal = {Human Brain Mapping},

volume = {34},

pages = {2511 - 2523},

abstract = {<p>Joint attention behaviors include initiating one’s own and responding to another’s bid for joint attention to an object, person, or topic. Joint attention abilities in autism are pervasively atypical, correlate with development of language and social abilities, and discriminate children with autism from other developmental disorders. Despite the importance of these behaviors, the neural correlates of joint attention in individuals with autism remain unclear. This paucity of data is likely due to the inherent challenge of acquiring data during a real-time social interaction. We used a novel experimental set-up in which participants engaged with an experimenter in an interactive face-to-face joint attention game during fMRI data acquisition. Both initiating and responding to joint attention behaviors were examined as well as a solo attention (SA) control condition. Participants included adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (n ¼ 13), a mean age- and sex-matched neurotypical group (n ¼ 14), and a separate group of neurotypical adults (n ¼ 22). Significant differences were found between groups within social-cognitive brain regions, including dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), during the RJA as compared to SA conditions. Region-of-interest analyses revealed a lack of signal differentiation between joint attention and control conditions within left pSTS and dMPFC in individuals with ASD. Within the pSTS, this lack of differentiation was characterized by reduced activation during joint attention and relative hyper-activation during SA. These findings suggest a possible failure of developmental neural specialization within the STS and dMPFC to joint attention in ASD.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{25,

title = {Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference},

author = {James Dungan and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-08-01},

urldate = {2012-08-01},

journal = {Cognitive Science},

volume = {36},

pages = {1148 - 1156},

abstract = {<p>Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{141,

title = {The power of being heard: The benefits of ‘perspective-giving’ in the context of intergroup conflict},

author = {Emile G Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022103112000297

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2012JESP.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.017},

issn = {00221031},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-07-01},

urldate = {2012-07-01},

journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},

volume = {48},

pages = {855 - 866},

abstract = {<p>Although hundreds of dialogue programs geared towards conflict resolution are offered every year, there have been few scientific studies of their effectiveness. Across 2 studies we examined the effect of controlled, dyadic interactions on attitudes towards the ‘other’ in members of groups involved in ideological conflict. Study 1 involved Mexican immigrants and White Americans in Arizona, and Study 2 involved Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Cross-group dyads interacted via video and text in a brief, structured, face-to-face exchange: one person was assigned to write about the difficulties of life in their society (‘perspective-giving’), and the second person was assigned to accurately summarize the statement of the first person (‘perspective-taking’). Positive changes in attitudes towards the outgroup were greater for Mexican immigrants and Palestinians after perspective-giving and for White Americans and Israelis after perspective-taking. For Palestinians, perspective-giving to an Israeli effectively changed attitudes towards Israelis, while a control condition in which they wrote an essay on the same topic without interacting had no effect on attitudes, illustrating the critical role of being heard. Thus, the effects of dialogue for conflict resolution depend on an interaction between dialogue condition and participants&$#$39; group membership, which may reflect power asymmetries.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{139,

title = {Look at this: the neural correlates of initiating and responding to bids for joint attention},

author = {Elizabeth Redcay and Mario Kleiner and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00169/abstract

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/fnhum-06-00169.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.3389/fnhum.2012.00169},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-06-01},

urldate = {2012-06-01},

journal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience},

volume = {6},

pages = {169},

abstract = {<p>When engaging in joint attention, one person directs another person’s attention to an object (Initiating Joint Attention, IJA), and the second person’s attention follows (Responding to Joint Attention, RJA). As such, joint attention must occur within the context of a social interaction. This ability is critical to language and social development; yet the neural bases for this pivotal skill remain understudied. This paucity of research is likely due to the challenge in acquiring functional MRI data during a naturalistic, contingent social interaction. To examine the neural bases of both IJA and RJA we implemented a dual-video set-up that allowed for a face-to-face interaction between subject and experimenter via video during fMRI data collection. In each trial, participants either followed the experimenter’s gaze to a target (RJA) or cued the experimenter to look at the target (IJA). A control condition, solo attention (SA), was included in which the subject shifted gaze to a target while the experimenter closed her eyes. Block and event-related analyses were conducted and revealed common and distinct regions for IJA and RJA. Distinct regions included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for RJA and intraparietal sulcus and middle frontal gyrus for IJA (as compared to SA). Conjunction analyses revealed overlap in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) for IJA and RJA (as compared to SA) for the event analyses. Functional connectivity analyses during a resting baseline suggest joint attention processes recruit distinct but interacting networks, including social-cognitive, voluntary attention orienting, and visual networks. This novel experimental set-up allowed for the identification of the neural bases of joint attention during a real-time interaction and findings suggest that whether one is the initiator or responder, the dMPFC and right pSTS, are selectively recruited during periods of joint attention.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{137,

title = {Thin-slice perception develops slowly},

author = {Benjamin Balas and Nancy Kanwisher and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022096512000045

https://saxelab.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/nihms363806.pdf, PDF},

doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2012.01.002},

issn = {00220965},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-06-01},

urldate = {2012-06-01},

journal = {Journal of Experimental Child Psychology},

volume = {112},

pages = {257 - 264},

abstract = {<p>Body language and facial gesture provide sufficient visual information to support high-level social inferences from “thin slices” of behavior. Given short movies of non-verbal behavior, adults make reliable judgments in a large number of tasks. Here we find that the high precision of adult’s nonverbal social perception depends on the slow development, over childhood, of sensitivity to subtle visual cues. Children and adult participants watched short silent clips in which a target child played with Legos, either in the (off-screen) presence of an adult or alone. Participants judged whether the target was playing alone or not, that is, they detected the presence of a social interaction (from the behavior of one participant in that interaction). This task allowed us to compare performance across ages to the true answer. Children did not reach adult levels of performance on this task until age 9 or 10 years and we observed an interaction between age and video reversal. Adults and older children benefitted from the videos being played in temporal sequence, rather than reversed, suggesting that adults (but not young children) are sensitive to natural movement in social interactions.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{96,

title = {Insights into the origins of knowledge from the cognitive neuroscience of blindness},

author = {Marina Bedny and Rebecca Saxe},

url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02643294.2012.713342},

doi = {10.1080/02643294.2012.713342},

issn = {0264-3294},

year  = {2012},

date = {2012-03-01},

journal = {Cognitive Neuropsychology},

volume = {29},

pages = {56 - 84},

abstract = {<p>Children learn about the world through senses such as touch, smell, vision, and audition, but they conceive of the world in terms of objects, events, agents, and their mental states. A fundamental question in cognitive science is how nature and nurture contribute to the development of such conceptual categories. What innate mechanisms do children bring to the learning problem? How does experience contribute to development? In this article we discuss insights into these longstanding questions from cognitive neuroscience studies of blindness. Despite drastically different sensory experiences, behavioural and neuroscientific work suggests that blind children acquire typical concepts of objects, actions, and mental states. Blind people think and talk about these categories in ways that are similar to sighted people. Neuroimaging reveals that blind people make such judgements relying on the same neural mechanisms as sighted people. One way to interpret these findings is that neurocognitive development is largely hardwired, and so differences in experience have little consequence. Contrary to this interpretation, neuroimaging studies also show that blindness profoundly reorganizes the visual system. Most strikingly, developmental blindness enables “visual” circuits to participate in high-level cognitive functions, including language processing. Thus, blindness qualitatively changes sensory representations, but leaves conceptual representations largely unchanged. The effect of sensory experience on concepts is modest, despite the brain’s potential for neuroplasticity.</p>},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}